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THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH, 53(4-5), 363–391 (2016)
ANNUAL REVIEW OF SEX RESEARCH SPECIAL ISSUE
Scrutinizing Immutability: Research on Sexual Orientation and U.S. Legal Advocacy for
Sexual Minorities
Lisa M. Diamond
Clifford J. Rosky
We review scientific research and legal authorities to argue that the immutability of sexual orientation should no longer
be invoked as a foundation for the rights of individuals with same-sex attractions and relationships (i.e., sexual
minorities). On the basis of scientific research as well as U.S. legal rulings regarding lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB)
rights, we make three claims: First, arguments based on the immutability of sexual orientation are unscientific, given
what we now know from longitudinal, population-based studies of naturally occurring changes in the same-sex
attractions of some individuals over time. Second, arguments based on the immutability of sexual orientation are
unnecessary, in light of U.S. legal decisions in which courts have used grounds other than immutability to protect the
rights of sexual minorities. Third, arguments about the immutability of sexual orientation are unjust, because they
imply that same-sex attractions are inferior to other-sex attractions, and because they privilege sexual minorities who
experience their sexuality as fixed over those who experience their sexuality as fluid. We conclude that the legal rights
of individuals with same-sex attractions and relationships should not be framed as if they depend on a certain pattern
of scientific findings regarding sexual orientation.
In the 2015 landmark decision recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage,
Obergefell v. Hodges, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a question that has long occupied an
uncomfortable intersection between science and law: Is sexual orientation an “immutable”
characteristic? In striking down state laws against same-sex marriage, the Court declared that, in
recent years, “psychiatrists and others [have] recognized that sexual orientation is both a normal
expression of human sexuality and immutable” (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 8). The Court
reasoned that, because sexual orientation is immutable, the petitioners had no real choice but to
enter same-sex relationships: “[T]heir immutable nature dictates that same-sex marriage is their only
real path to this profound commitment” (p. 4).
In more colloquial terms, the Court has finally picked sides in the age-old nature/nurture
debate over sexual orientation: Are lesbian, gay, and bisexual (LGB) individuals “born that way,” or
do they have any choice in their sexuality? Although this is a fundamentally scientific question, it has
been repeatedly posed in political debates about LGB rights. As a result, scientific research has been
repeatedly invoked by both advocates and opponents of laws protecting individuals with same-sex
sexual orientations (reviewed in Halley, 1994; Hammack & Windell, 2011; Mucciaroni & Killian,
2004; Stein, 2014). Specifically, advocates for the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals have used
scientific research on the immutability of sexual orientation to argue that anti-LGB laws violate the
U.S. Constitution’s Equal Protection Clause, given that the immutability of sexual orientation is one
factor that courts have historically considered to determine the constitutionality of such laws.
Our goal is to provide a comprehensive review of the current scientific and legal status of
the claim that sexual orientation is immutable, with the goal of demonstrating that immutability
should no longer be invoked as a foundation for the rights of individuals with same-sex attractions
and relationships (a group we refer to collectively as sexual minorities). We make three specific c
claims regarding immutability arguments for the rights of sexual minorities, with special attention
devoted to the issue of same-sex marriage in U.S. law. First, arguments based on the immutability of
sexual orientation are unscientific c, given that scientific research does not indicate that sexual
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orientation is uniformly biologically determined at birth or that patterns of same-sex and other-sex
attractions remain fixed over the life course. Second, arguments based on the immutability of sexual
orientation are unnecessary, in light of two decades of U.S. legal decisions—including the most
recent Supreme Court rulings on same-sex marriage—in which courts have used grounds other than
immutability to protect the rights of sexual minorities. Third, arguments about the immutability of
sexual orientation are unjust, because they imply that same-sex attractions are inferior to other-sex
attractions, and because they privilege sexual minorities who experience their sexuality as fixed over
those who experience their sexuality as fluid.
Bisexuality is particularly critical to consider in this regard. Individuals with bisexual
attractions and/or behaviors have been largely missing from both scientific and legal debates about
the immutability of sexual orientation (Boucai, 2012; Rust, 2000c; Yoshino, 2000), no doubt because
their very existence, and the sheer diversity of bisexual pathways and experiences, troubles the rigid
categorical distinction between homosexuality and heterosexuality on which immutability debates
have been premised (Firestein, 1996; Rust, 2000b, 2000c, 2009; Yoshino, 2000). Of course, the
rigidly bounded categories of “homosexual” and “heterosexual” are themselves products of culture,
history, and cognition (D’ Emilio, 1983; Foucault, 1980; Herdt, 1990), and many other cultures have
more fluid conceptions of gender and sexuality that more easily accommodate bisexuality or that
organize sexual identities and relations around dimensions of age, power, gender, and social class
rather than (or in addition to) exclusive patterns of same-sex or other-sex desire (Blackwood, 2000;
Cardoso & Werner, 2013; Herdt & Boxer, 1995; Murray, 2000). Analysis of such cultural differences
is beyond the scope of our discussion, but we want to highlight that the theoretical and legal
challenges posed by bisexuality flow directly from the West’s longstanding overemphasis on
homosexual and heterosexual categories of personhood (Sedgwick, 1990). As we address in the third
section of this article, such categories fail to represent the true diversity of sexual-minority
experience.
Importantly, our focus on same-sex sexuality necessarily neglects other forms of sexual
diversity. Scientists and advocates have debated the causes, implications, and legal status of a diverse
range of sexual-minority experiences and identities over the past several decades, including
polyamory (e.g., openly maintaining more than one intimate relationship at a time), asexuality (e.g.,
experiencing no sexual attractions), transgender identity and gender variance, and nonnormative
erotic practices such as sadomasochism (for relevant reviews, see Emens, 2014; Halberstam, 2005;
Kleinplatz & Diamond, 2013; Minter, 2012; Seto, Abramowitz, & Barbaree, 2008; Tweedy, 2011).
Immutability arguments have relevance for all such forms of sexual and gender diversity, but we
constrain our focus to sexual orientation because the legal debates over same-sex marriage have
provided the most well-developed “laboratory” for investigating the stakes of immutability claims
for sexual-minority rights. As other marginalized groups increasingly advocate for social and legal
recognition, we expect that the present analysis will clarify the shortcomings of using immutability
claims to protect gender and sexual expression in other settings.
Background on Immutability Arguments in Science and Law
For more than 50 years, opponents of the rights of sexual minorities have argued that samesex relationships represent deviant lifestyle choices that should be socially discouraged, and
advocates for sexual minorities have countered by arguing that sexual orientation is a fixed,
biologically based trait that cannot be chosen or changed (Burr, 1996; Caramagno, 2002; Halley,
1994; LeVay, 2011; Mucciaroni&Killian, 2004; Stein, 2014). These arguments have borrowed their
logic from civil rights claims regarding race and ethnicity, essentially claiming that individuals must
not be persecuted “on the basis of something about themselves that is fundamentally determined”
2
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(Vargas & O’ Donnell, 2013, p. 4). The “born/chosen” debate was specifically invoked in amicus
curiae briefs filed to the Supreme Court United States v. Windsor and Perry v. Hollingsworth, the
2013 cases on same-sex marriage. For example, Paul McHugh, a psychiatrist at Johns Hopkins,
argued in his amicus curiae brief that an equal protection claim could not be made on behalf of
sexual minorities because the scientific evidence failed to show that they were a discrete group
sharing an immutable trait (McHugh, 2013). The Gay and Lesbian Medical Association submitted
their own amicus curiae brief, titled “On the Immutability of Sexual Orientation” (Vargas & O’
Donnell, 2013), which challenged McHugh’s argument and cited a different set of scientific findings
to show that sexual orientation was biologically based rather than chosen.
The final decisions in the Windsor and Perry cases did not, in the end, take up the
immutability question. And although the Obergefell v. Hodges decision made reference to the
immutability of sexual orientation, the concept of immutability played a gratuitous role in the legal
reasoning underlying this landmark ruling. Hence, we think it is high time to retire immutability
approaches to sexual-minority rights. We are certainly not the first to make this argument (Bruni,
2012; deBoer, 2015; Halley, 1994; Mucciaroni & Killian, 2004; Warren, 2009). Halley, in particular,
published a powerful critique of the immutability approach to sexual-minority rights more than 20
years ago, which remains as pertinent as ever (Halley, 1994). Nonetheless, immutability claims
continue to permeate social discourse
about the rights of sexual minorities (e.g., Copland, 2015; Ghose, 2015; Khan, 2015; Rahman, 2015).
The climate may finally be ripe for lasting change. We hope that our review of scientific findings and
legal rulings regarding immutability will deal these arguments a final and fatal blow.
We begin with a detailed review of scientific evidence on sexual orientation showing that
immutability claims have been oversimplified and overgeneralized. We then review recent U.S. court
decisions on same-sex marriage, demonstrating the numerous successful legal arguments for the civil
rights of sexual minorities which do not depend on the claim that sexual orientation is immutable—
at least not in the traditional sense meaning that it cannot be chosen or changed. Finally, we
conclude by arguing that scientists and legal scholars, within their respective domains, must not
privilege the needs and experiences of sexual minorities who experience their attractions as
immutable over those who do not.
Because our argument concerns the intersection between science and the law, we include
considerable detail on both scientific findings and legal rulings. This format may seem jarring to
readers who are more accustomed to purely scientific reviews (which are typically unconcerned with
the legal implications of their findings) and purely legal reviews (which are typically unconcerned
with the precise details of the scientific findings they cite). Yet we believe an analysis that jointly
tackles the scientific and legal basis of immutability arguments is critical to the future contribution of
science to the public interest.
IMMUTABILITY CLAIMS ARE UNSCIENTIFIC
One fact about sexual orientation garners near-universal agreement from scientists: It has no
single cause (reviewed in Bailey et al., in press). Rather, multiple biological and nonbiological factors
interact to shape the adult expression of same-sex sexuality, and the mix of causal factors may differ
from person to person, and for males versus females. We focus here on genetic and neuroendocrine
contributions to same-sex sexuality because these contributions have the strongest empirical
support. Our summary is necessarily abbreviated, and we refer readers to more comprehensive
reviews for greater detail (Bailey et al., in press; Bao & Swaab, 2011; Hill, Dawood, & Puts, 2013;
Rahman, 2005).
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Before turning to the evidence, it is important to note that sexual orientation is not easy to
define or measure. This obviously poses a problem for research on the causes of sexual orientation,
given that the first step in such research is to identify individuals with different sexual orientations.
Sexual orientation is a multifaceted phenomenon, incorporating sexual attractions, sexual arousal,
sexual fantasy, sexual behavior, and sexual identity (reviewed in Bailey et al., in press; Klein,
Sepekoff, & Wolf, 1985; Rosario & Schrimshaw, 2014). Different researchers have emphasized
different facets, and the facets themselves do not always coincide. For example, many individuals
report same-sex attractions or sexual arousal in the absence of a gay/lesbian/ bisexual identity, and
many individuals report bisexual patterns of attraction but pursue exclusively same-sex or othersex
relationships (Chivers & Bailey, 2005; Cramer, Chevalier, Gemberling, Stroud, & Graham, 2015;
Igartua, Thombs, Burgos, & Montoro, 2009; Lhomond, Saurel-Cubizolles, & Michaels, 2014;
Matthews, Blosnich, Farmer, & Adams, 2014; Starks, Nadler, Sagrestano, & Sarvela, 2009).
Cultural factors often contribute to discrepancies between individuals’ sexual identities,
attractions, and behaviors. Mustanski, Birkett, et al. (2014) pooled two national probability samples,
yielding a combined sample size of more than 50,000, to examine ethnic differences in the
associations between behavior and identity. Youth in each sexual identity group (gay/lesbian,
heterosexual, bisexual) were described as concordant if their identity matched their pattern of
behavior (e.g., gay/lesbian youth reporting exclusively same-sex behavior; bisexual youth reporting
mixed behavior), and discordant if their identity did not match their pattern of behavior. Black and
Hispanic youths in the gay/lesbian group were more likely to be discordant than Whites, yet Black
youths in the bisexual group were less likely to be discordant than Whites. The reasons for these
differences are not clear, but variation across ethnic groups in the meanings attached to same-sex
sexuality likely plays a role. Adolescents who are trying to decide whether they are gay, bisexual,
confused, or experimenting will necessarily look to the knowledge, experiences, values, and norms
of their local communities, and different ethnic communities will provide sharply different answers.
Some communities may discount the relevance of same-sex attractions or behavior, and others may
provide no route for youth to develop lesbian, gay, or bisexual identities while maintaining their
ethnic identities (Chan, 1995; Consolacion, Russell, & Sue, 2004; Jamil, Harper, & Fernandez, 2009;
McLean, 2003; Parks, Hughes, & Matthews, 2004).
Given the degree to which identity and behavior are structured by social context, social
constraints, and social opportunities, most researchers treat sexual attractions as the primary
indicator of an individual’s underlying sexual orientation (Mustanski, Van Wagenen, Birkett, Eyster,
& Corliss, 2014). Yet even attractions do not provide a perfect index, given that they can be
influenced by a range of factors other than sexual orientation, such as opportunities to encounter
desirable same-sex and other-sex individuals (Diamond, 2003). Although our review will employ the
standard scientific (and lay) practice of using the term sexual orientation to denote a consistent
pattern of same-sex and/or other-sex sexual attraction, we want to emphasize that none of the
studies reviewed here can claim to have definatively assessed the core construct of sexual
orientation, given its inherently multidimensional nature. (We will revisit this issue in more detail
when discussing the question of whether some individuals can “choose” their orientation.)
Genetic Contributions to Sexual Orientation
Before we review the extant data on genetic contributions to sexual orientation, a caution is
in order: The field of behavioral genetics is currently undergoing a paradigm shift that challenges
conventional understandings of genetic inheritance (reviewed in Charney, 2012; Richardson &
Stevens, 2015) due to emerging understandings of phenomena such as epigenetic regulation.
Epigenetics focuses on chemical mechanisms that alter the expression of genes at different points in
4
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the organism’s life cycle, essentially switching certain genes on and off in response to certain
environmental influences. These environmentally released changes can have significant and lasting
consequences for the phenotypic expression of genetically influenced traits, and can even be passed
down to future generations, directly challenging traditional models of genetic inheritance. Whereas
previous behavioral genetic research viewed the DNA sequence as a fixed genetic record
constituting the sole mechanism for the inheritance of traits, newer research focuses on the
epigenome: the complex constellation of chemical compounds which are not part of the DNA
sequence itself but which attach to it and alter gene expression at different stages of the life cycle in
response to environmental influences.
Epigenetics opens up exciting new possibilities for investigating the genetic bases of
complex traits such as sexual orientation (see Ngun & Vilain, 2014; Rice, Friberg, &
Gavrilets, 2012). In fact, recent studies using epigenetic models have proven more successful in
explaining population variance in same-sex sexuality than studies using conventional genetic models
(Ngun et al., 2015). Therefore, future research on the genetics of sexual orientation may increasingly
focus on environmentally released changes in gene expression and how these changes are passed
down, rather than the simple presence or absence of certain genes at birth. In essence, the current
scientific revolution in our understanding of the human epigenome challenges the very notion of
being “born gay,” along with the notion of being “born” with any complex trait. Rather, our genetic
legacy is dynamic, developmental, and environmentally embedded.
The paradigm-shifting insights emerging from postgenomic research (Richardson & Stevens,
2015) can make it difficult to interpret the findings of older studies using traditional behavioral
genetic methodologies, such as twin concordance studies and genome-wide association scans. Yet
these are precisely the methods that have been used to study sexual orientation. Findings from these
studies (reviewed in this article) still make critical contributions to our understanding of the genetics
of sexual orientation, but we expect that our interpretation of these findings will change in future
years as postgenomic approaches are increasingly applied to the complex phenomenon of same-sex
sexuality.
With this in mind, what have we learned about sexual orientation from conventional
behavioral genetic methods? These methods have focused on the heritability of sexual orientation
(i.e., the degree to which same-sex sexuality runs in families) and the existence of specific genetic
markers associated with same-sex sexuality. Both of these lines of research have found significant
evidence for genetic contributions to same-sex sexuality, but neither suggests that sexual orientation
is genetically determined. A recent review of the most reliable scientific studies (Bailey et al., in
press) estimated that the heritability of sexual orientation is approximately.32, meaning that 32% of
the population variability in sexual orientation is due to genetic factors. (Note that this says nothing
about the degree to which a single individual’s sexual orientation is genetically influenced; heritability
estimates concern variability between persons in a population, not the balance of genetic and
environmental influences within persons.)
To provide a basis of comparison, it is helpful to note that higher estimates of heritability
(ranging from.4 to.6) have been found for a range of characteristics that are not widely considered
immutable, such as being divorced, smoking, having low back pain, and feeling body dissatisfaction
(Ferreira, Beckenkamp, Maher, Hopper, & Ferreira, 2013; Jocklin, McGue, & Lykken, 1996; KeskiRahkonen et al., 2005; Lessov-Schlaggar, Kristjansson, Bucholz, Heath, & Madden, 2012). Bailey
and colleagues (in press) concluded from their review that sexual orientation is somewhat—but not
mostly—genetic, and that it is unquestioningly influenced by environmental factors, given the
relatively low concordance of same-sex orientation in identical twins. Concordance refers to the
probability that an individual is gay given that his or her identical twin is gay. Across the most
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reliable twin registry studies available, the median concordance estimate for sexual orientation
among identical twins is.25. In summary, despite the fact that identical twins share 100% of their
genes, gay/gay twin pairs are less common than gay/straight twin pairs. The twin data clearly show a
genetic contribution to sexuality (because even a twin concordance as low as.25 is significantly
greater than would be expected by chance, given the low base rate of same-sex sexuality in the
population), but not genetic determination (which would produce perfect concordance in identical
twins).
Other approaches to investigating genetic influences on sexual orientation have focused on
identifying specific genetic variants associated with same-sex sexuality. Several comprehensive
reviews of these data are available (Dawood, Bailey, & Martin, 2009; Hill et al., 2013), and so we
focus on one of the largest recent studies, whose findings align with the findings of other similar
studies. Researchers analyzed the genomes of more than 23,000 men and women that had been
collected by the company 23andMe, and found no genetic loci that were significantly associated with
sexual orientation in either men or women (Drabant et al., 2012). However, the marker that came
closest to statistical significance among men was located on pericentromeric chromosome 8, a
region which had been identified as a possible marker for male sexual orientation in a previous
genomewide association study (Mustanski et al., 2005). As with the findings of heritability, this
supports a genetic contribution to sexual orientation, but not genetic determination.
Across all genetic research there has been consistently stronger evidence for genetic
influence on male sexual orientation than on female sexual orientation (Bailey et al., in press; Hyde,
2005; Mustanski, Chivers, & Bailey, 2002). No specific genetic markers appear to be reliably
associated with female same-sex sexuality, and heritability estimates for female sexual orientation
have varied more widely across different studies than the heritability estimates for male sexual
orientation. This might suggest that different genes contribute to female same-sex sexuality than
male same-sex sexuality, and it might also be due to the existence of more variable social controls on
female than male same-sex sexuality. Although female sexuality has historically been subject to more
social control than male sexuality (Baumeister & Twenge, 2002), stigmatization of homosexuality is
typically greater for men than for women (reviewed in Mondimore, 1996). Variable social controls
create variable contexts for the expression of genetic predispositions. The heritability of smoking
provides an apt analogy, given that social attitudes about smoking (like social attitudes about samesex sexuality) have changed over time and vary widely across different cultures and communities. As
Boardman, Blalock, and Pampel (2010) summarized, “When smoking is widely accepted and
common, social incentives and motivations to smoke may overwhelm the influence of genetic
characteristics. However, when smoking involves controversy over its dangers and the weighing of
costs and benefits by individuals, genetic influences may better predict smoking —social smokers
with less physical dependence do more to avoid smoking than those with genetic propensities for
physical dependence” (p. 109). Similarly, the greater and more consistent stigmatization of male
same-sex sexuality than female same-sex sexuality should allow genetic propensities to play a greater
and more consistent role in the expression of male than female same-sex sexuality. If cultural
attitudes toward female and male sexuality become more similar in the future, then gender
differences in the heritability of sexual orientation may change.
Before leaving the topic of genetics, we want to call attention to the cultural privileging of
genetic “origin stories.” As Halley (1994) noted, one of the factors that fed the increasing
prominence of immutability claims for sexual-minority rights in the 1990s was the “cultural success
of genetics as a source of knowledge about who we are as humans” (p. 512), fostered by the success
of the Human Genome Project. If anything, this fascination with genetic origin stories has only
intensified, spurred by the growth of commercial industries purporting to reveal one’s own
personalized genetic heritage for a fee. Genetic information has also been increasingly used to
6
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investigate and verify the relatedness of cultural groups (most notably indigenous peoples, as shown
by TallBear, 2007, 2008), and such practices starkly posit genetics as the ultimate authority on
human origins, families, and “types.” Although some hope that genetic science will eventually help
dismantle systems of oppression by revealing the shared genetic heritage linking disparate groups,
genetic science is embedded within larger social and economic systems that typically seek to
entrench rather than challenge social hierarchies (TallBear, 2013). Following this reasoning, it may be
naive to expect that the identification of a genetic basis for same-sex sexuality will promote its
acceptance and social legitimation. Certainly, some individuals would view such findings as further
evidence that homosexuality is a disease to be controlled rather than a form of human diversity
(Greenberg & Bailey, 2001; Sedgwick, 1990).
Neuroendocrine Contributions to Sexual Orientation
Although genetic studies of sexual orientation typically receive the lion’s share of attention
by journalists, lawyers, and advocates, an equally active line of research concerns exposure to
perinatal hormones, sometimes called the neuroendocrine model. The neuroendocrine model is not
in competition with genetic models but simply focuses on a different and more specific underlying
mechanism. Specifically, this model proposes that variations in exposure to androgens and estrogens
in utero may shape later sexual orientation. Prenatal hormonal exposure in utero has
welldocumented organizational effects on the developing fetal brain, creating sex differences in
regions including the hypothalamus, the septum, the preoptic area, and the amygdala (Baum, 2006;
Gooren, 2006; Hines, 2004; Reinisch & Sanders, 1992). Accordingly, this model hypothesizes that if
a boy or a girl is exposed to sex-atypical levels of androgens or estrogens, this exposure may alter the
sex differentiation of his or her brain structure in a manner that fosters sexatypical behavior and/or
same-sex attraction. Proponents of this model cite animal studies finding that sex-atypical exposure
to androgens or estrogens in utero is associated with sex-atypical behavior and partner choice (i.e.,
male animals show the sexual behaviors and partner choices typically associated with females, and
female animals show the sexual behavior and partner choices associated with males, see AdkinsRegan, 2011; Henley, Nunez, & Clemens, 2011; Roselli & Stormshak, 2009; Vasey, 2002).
Obviously, it is difficult to extrapolate from animal studies to humans, and the direct
evidence for prenatal hormone influences on adult sexual orientation is limited (for detailed reviews
and critiques, see Hill et al., 2013; Hines, 2011; Jordan-Young, 2010, 2012; Rahman, 2005). Perhaps
the most relevant evidence comes from studies of girls with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH), a
condition in which fetuses are exposed to unusually high levels of androgens in utero as a result of
disruptions in the synthesis of cortisol by the adrenal gland. Girls with CAH have received so much
fetal androgen exposure by the time that they are born that they typically have partially masculinized
genitals, which may be surgically altered at birth. As a result, girls with CAH allow for the
investigation of prenatal androgen effects on female sexual orientation: If prenatal androgen
exposure is a primary contributor to female sexual orientation, one would expect all CAH girls to
develop stable, robust, and consistent lesbian or bisexual orientations, given that they have received
a far stronger “dose” of prenatal androgens than the average, non-CAH lesbian or bisexual would be
expected to receive.
Yet this is not the case. Longitudinal research has found that although CAH girls are more
likely than age-matched controls to report same-sex attractions, the majority identify as heterosexual
and report exclusively other-sex attractions and sexual behavior (Meyer-Bahlburg, Dolezal, Baker, &
New, 2008). Hence, as with the genetic data, the evidence does not support straightforward
causation. Other human studies investigating the neuroendocrine hypothesis have investigated
sexual orientation differences in anatomical characteristics known to be affected by prenatal
7
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hormone exposure (such as the size of specific brain regions) or on maternal characteristics that
affect the hormonal milieu experienced by the developing fetus, most notably the number and
genders of prior births (for reviews, see Bailey et al., in press; Hill et al., 2013; Hines, 2011; Rahman,
2005). The overall body of evidence is mixed (as critiqued by Jordan-Young, 2012), again suggesting
that prenatal hormones potentially contribute to same-sex sexuality in some individuals but do not
determine it.
Can Sexual Orientation Change?
Even if sexual orientation were wholly determined by genes or by perinatal hormones, it
would not mean that it was immutable, given that immutable means “unchangeable.” Although the
status of a trait as biologically determined is often conflated with its capacity to change over the life
course, these are not synonymous constructs. Hence, the fact that genes and/or perinatal hormones
may contribute to the development of sexual orientation says nothing about whether sexual
orientation undergoes change, or whether it can be consciously chosen by individuals who possess
no genetic or neuroendocrine predisposition for it. Issues of change and choice have loomed large in
debates over sexual- minority rights, going back to Anita Bryant’s anti-gay campaign in the late
1970s (Rosky, 2013a, 2013b). Specifically, those opposed to sexual-minority rights have historically
argued that sexual minorities are not, in fact, a normal and natural group of individuals suffering
unwarranted discrimination but a group that has made harmful and/or immoral sexual choices.
According to this view, sexual minorities are fundamentally responsible for any social difficulties
they face as a result of these choices, and society should openly marginalize them to discourage
other individuals (especially children, as shown in Rosky, 2013a, 2013b) from making the same
deviant choices themselves. This logic has been directly invoked in debates over same-sex marriage
(Boucai, 2012): Former Supreme Court nominee Robert Bork, for example, argued against same-sex
marriage rights on the basis that social acceptance of same-sex relationships might induce other
individuals to choose such relationships (Bork, 2004).
Setting aside for now the legal and political effectiveness of these arguments (which we
address later), what is their scientific status? Three different lines of evidence speak to these
questions. One line of evidence concerns the propensity of individuals to willfully modify their
pattern of sexual attraction through sexual orientation change efforts, or SOCE (often colloquially
described as “reparative therapy”). A second line of evidence concerns whether sexual orientation
appears to undergo longitudinal change on its own, outside the context of therapeutic efforts. A
third line of evidence concerns whether some sexual minorities themselves perceive that they have
some choice in their same-sex sexuality.
Data bearing on SOCE are perhaps the most relevant because SOCE combines the capacity
for change with the capacity for choice. If efforts to willfully change sexual orientation are effective,
then individuals with a same-sex orientation can presumably escape discrimination (or could have
achieved marriage in the pre-Obergefell era) simply by choosing to change to a heterosexual
orientation. (It bears noting, however, that the majority of individuals seeking to change their sexual
orientation report doing so for religious reasons rather than to escape discrimination, e.g., Borowich,
2008; Bradshaw, Dehlin, Crowell, Galliher, & Bradshaw, 2015; Dehlin, Galliher, Bradshaw, Hyde, &
Crowell, 2015; Jones & Yarhouse, 2011.) In 2009, the American Psychological Association published
a comprehensive review of research evaluating the effectiveness and ethics of these therapies. The
findings were stark: SOCE are not only ineffective in changing sexual orientation but are
psychologically damaging, often resulting in elevated rates of depression, anxiety, and suicidality
(APA Task Force on Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation, 2009). Although
some individuals report satisfaction with the cognitive strategies they have learned for avoiding
8
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same-sex behavior and enhancing emotional connections to heterosexual spouses, the same-sex
attractions themselves remain. (And as noted earlier, it is attraction, rather than behavior, which
scientists consider to be the key marker of sexual orientation, as reviewed in Mustanski, Van
Wagenen, et al., 2014.) The APA report recommends that therapists work sensitively to assist
individuals with reconciling their religious and sexual identity but concludes that therapists cannot
ethically offer individuals the promise of changing their sexual orientation, given the lack of evidence
that such permanent change can be therapeutically achieved.
What about change that occurs outside the context of SOCE? The best and most reliable
data on “naturally occurring” change in sexual orientation come from studies that have
longitudinally tracked large, population-based samples of heterosexual and sexual-minority
individuals (Dickson, Paul, & Herbison, 2003; Mock & Eibach, 2012; Ott, Corliss, Wypij, Rosario, &
Austin, 2011; Savin-Williams, Joyner, & Rieger, 2012; Savin-Williams & Ream, 2007). Notably, the
data provided by these groundbreaking studies were unavailable in the 1980s and early 1990s, when
legal arguments regarding the immutability of sexual orientation gained a boost from the growing
neurobiological and genetic research on sexual orientation (reviewed by Halley, 1994). At that time,
not a single large-scale prospective study on the stability of same-sex attractions had been
conducted. Several such studies have now been completed, and they unequivocally demonstrate that
same-sex and other-sex attractions do change over time in some individuals. The degree of change is
difficult to reliably estimate, given differences in study measures, but the occurrence of change is
indisputable. Sections that follow describe the prevalence and direction of change across the most
reliable studies; because the succession of statistics can be difficult to digest, a complete tabular
summary of these findings can be found in Table 1.
Savin-Williams et al. (2012) analyzed data from the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (Add Health), which has been regularly tracking same-sex attractions and sexual
identity in a random, representative sample of more than 12,000 adolescents since 1994. We focus
here on changes in attractions reported between the third wave of data collection (when respondents
were between 18 and 24 years old, with a mean age of 22) and the fourth wave of data collection
(when respondents were between 24 and 34 years old, with a mean age of 29). We focus on these
waves because the measures used to assess same-sex attraction were more specific than at previous
waves and hence less likely to have been misinterpreted, and also because evidence suggests that at
younger ages, when respondents were around 16 years old, some of the boys’ ˇˇˇˇˇ reports of samesex attractions may have been intentionally capricious (i.e., due to “jokester” youths giving false
reports; Savin- Williams & Joyner, 2014).
At the third and fourth waves of data collection, respondents were asked to describe
themselves as 100% heterosexual, Mostly heterosexual, Bisexual, Mostly homosexual, or 100%
homosexual. Of the 5.7% of men and 13.7% of women who chose one of the nonheterosexual
descriptors at Wave 3, 43% of the men and 50% of the women chose a different sexual orientation
category six years later. Of those who changed, two-thirds changed to the category 100%
heterosexual. Rates of change were greatest (and transitions to 100% heterosexual were most
common) among those who initially described themselves as Mostly heterosexual (which was the
single largest subgroup of nonheterosexuals, accounting for 58% of the men and 74% of the women
reporting any same-sex attractions). In men, 59% of the Mostly heterosexual group changed over
the following six years, and 82% of those transitions were to 100% heterosexual. In women, 47% of
the Mostly heterosexual group changed over the following six years, and 84% of those transitions
were to 100 % heterosexual. In contrast, only 8% of the exclusively homosexual men and 26% of
the exclusively homosexual women who initially considered themselves exclusively gay changed
categories six years later. Of the exclusive heterosexuals, 3% of the men and 11% of the
heterosexual women switched to a nonheterosexual category six years later.
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Ott et al. (2011) assessed change in sexual orientation in the Growing Up Today Study
(GUTS). This study included more than 13,000 youth who were the children of women who
participated in the well-known Nurses Health Study II (NHSII), a prospective cohort study of more
than 116,000 registered nurses. Although this study did not involve a random representative sample
of youth, the size and breadth of the sample contributes unprecedented information on longitudinal
change in sexuality during young adulthood. Participants described themselves as Completely
heterosexual, Mostly heterosexual, Bisexual, Mostly homosexual, Completely homosexual, or
Unsure. Of the 7.5% of men and 8.7% of women who chose a nonheterosexual descriptor at ages
18 to 21, 43% of the men and 46% of the women chose a different category by age 23. Among the
same-sex attracted youth who changed, 57% of the men’s changes and 62% of the women’s changes
involved switching to Completely heterosexual.

As found with Add Health (Savin-Williams et al., 2012), change was most common among those
with attractions to both sexes (including the bisexual group as well as the Mostly heterosexual and
Mostly homosexual groups) and least common among those who described themselves as
exclusively homosexual. Of those who initially described themselves as exclusively homosexual, 10%
of the men and 33% of the women changed categories by age 23. Of those who considered
themselves exclusively heterosexual at 18 to 21 years of age, 4% of the men and 6% of the women
changed categories by age 23.
The National Survey of Midlife Development (MIDUS) assessed sexual identity at two
different points in time, ten years apart, in a representative sample of approximately 2,600
individuals, ranging in age from 25 to 74 (the mean age was 47 at the first assessment). The fact that
this study asked individuals whether they were homosexual, heterosexual, or bisexual, rather than
simply asking about their same-sex and othersex attractions, is likely responsible for the fact that so
few respondents (less than 1% among both men and women) described themselves as homosexual
or bisexual. Yet among this group 64% of the women and 26% of the men identified their sexual
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orientation differently 10 years later (Mock & Eibach, 2012). Half of the men’s changes and 55% of
the women’s changes involved switching to heterosexuality. Similar to the other longitudinal studies
cited, changes were less common among those with exclusively same-sex attractions than those with
bisexual attractions: Of those who initially considered themselves homosexual (as opposed to
bisexual) at Time 1, 10% of the men and 64% of the women changed categories by Time 2. Changes
were rare among those who initially described themselves as heterosexual; only 1% of men and 1%
of the women who considered themselves heterosexual at Time 1 changed categories by Time 2.
The Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and Development Study (DMHD) is one of the
longest-term longitudinal studies (although it does not involve a random sample). A birth cohort of
approximately 1,000 New Zealanders in a single city have been observed from their early 20s to their
late 30s (Dickson et al., 2003; Dickson, Roode, Cameron, & Paul, 2013). Respondents were asked to
describe their current pattern of attraction as Only to the opposite sex, More often to the opposite
sex but at least once to the same sex, About equally to both sexes, More often to the same sex but at
least once to the opposite sex, Only to the same sex, never to the same sex, or Not attracted to
anyone. Given the multiple assessments, these data permit us to examine changes between ages 21
and 26, between ages 26 and 32, and between ages 32 and 38. As shown in Table 1, rates of change
do not appear to decline as respondents get older. Rates of change in attractions among same-sexattracted men ranged from 26% to 45%, and rates of change in same-sex-attracted women ranged
from 55% to 60%. Among the same-sexattracted men reporting change, between 67% and 100% of
the changes were toward heterosexuality, and this also was true for 83% to 91% of the same-sexattracted women undergoing changes. Overall, changes among men who identified as heterosexual
were observed in 1% to 2% of men and ranged from 4% to 12% among heterosexual women.
Given the consistency of these findings, it is not scientifically accurate to describe same-sex
sexual orientation as a uniformly immutable trait. Although some sexual-minority individuals report
consistent patterns of same-sex attraction over time, other sexual-minority individuals undergo
changes: sometimes increases/decreases in same-sex attractions and sometimes increases/decreases
in other-sex attractions. The question of why such changes occur and why they appear to occur
more commonly in women than men remains an active and unresolved topic of debate (Diamond,
2007, 2012; Kuhle & Radke, 2013; Ross, Daneback, & Månsson, 2012; Yost & McCarthy, 2012).
Qualitative interview studies indicate that women’s changes in sexual attractions are typically
experienced as unexpected and unintentional, and are often linked to the onset of specific same-sex
or other-sex relationships (Diamond, 2007, 2008b; Golden, 1987). Neurobiological research has
documented numerous linkages between the neural substrates of sexual desire and the neural
substrates of emotional attachment, and one possibility is that the formation of emotional
attachments may facilitate unexpected changes in sexual desire (Diamond, 2003; Diamond &
Dickenson, 2012).
The fact that change appears less common among individuals with exclusive attractions than
those with bisexual attractions may suggest that exclusive attractions—whether exclusively same-sex
or exclusively other-sex—are fundamentally more stable than bisexual patterns of attraction.
Alternatively (or in addition), individuals with bisexual patterns of attraction may have more
opportunities for the types of experiences (such as transitions between same-sex and other-sex
relationships) that provide catalysts for change, along with a context in which such change can be
brought into conscious awareness.
Social influence, in the form of increased visibility and acceptance of same-sex sexuality, may
also play a role in longitudinal change. Increases in social acceptance may prove particularly
influential for bisexually attracted individuals, who may choose to set aside their capacity for samesex relationships unless they are exposed to social contexts that are supportive and accepting of
same-sex sexuality. Arguably, the most supportive and accepting social context for same-sex
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sexuality would be a household headed by a same-sex couple: if same-sex sexuality can be enhanced
by social acceptance, one would expect that children raised by same-sex couples would be more
likely to consider and to pursue same-sex relationships themselves. In fact, this is the case. Longterm longitudinal research on lesbian-headed families (Gartrell, Bos, & Goldberg, 2011) found that
lateadolescent girls who were raised from birth by lesbian parents were more likely than age-matched
controls to report same-sex attraction and behavior. The most likely explanation (given that not all
of the children were genetically related to their mothers) is that girls raised by lesbian mothers
experienced a family climate of acceptance regarding same-sex relationships and received less
exposure (relative to the average female adolescent) to conventional societal pressures to pursue
exclusively heterosexual relationships. As a result, they may have been more willing and able to
consider—and to positively evaluate—their own propensity for same-sex sexuality. Of course, this is
exactly what anti-gay activists have long warned about: Anita Bryant cautioned back in 1979 that the
agenda of the gay rights movement was to propose to children that same-sex relationships
represented an acceptable alternative to heterosexuality, increasing the chance that they would
engage in same-sex sexuality themselves (Bryant, 1979). This may be precisely what has happened
among the teenagers raised by lesbian-headed families, although contrary to Bryant’s warnings they
have suffered no psychological, academic, or social deficits as a result (Gartrell & Bos, 2010).
Interestingly, the propensity for increased social acceptance of same-sex sexuality to foster
increased populationwide expression of same-sex sexuality appears to have been happening for
some time, especially among women (who, as reviewed, show less evidence for genetic heritability in
their same-sex sexuality and greater rates of longitudinal change relative to men). Mercer et al. (2013)
analyzed data from three independent administrations (in 1990, 1999, and 2010) of the British
National Survey of Sexual Attitudes and Lifestyles, each of which used a representative probability
sample. The 1990 sample contained more than 18,000 respondents, the 1999 sample contained more
than 11,000 respondents, and the 2010 sample contained more than 15,000 respondents. The rates
of same-sex behavior among men did not significantly change across the three samples (ranging
between 6% and 8%). Yet among women there was a fourfold increase in same-sex behavior (the
rate was 3.7% in 1990, 9.7% in 1999, and 16% in 2010). Similar historical changes have been
observed in other studies that have analyzed historical trends in the results of populationbased
assessments of sexual activity. In the Netherlands, reports of same-sex attraction in women have
undergone a sixfold increase, from 3% in 1989 to 18% in 2009, and women’s reports of same-sex
behavior have undergone a threefold increase, from 4% to 12%. In men, same-sex attractions have
doubled from 1989 to 2009, increasing from 6% to 12%, although behavior remained stable at
around 12% (Kuyper & Vanwesenbeeck, 2009). Importantly, these patterns might indicate historical
changes in respondents’ experience of same-sex sexuality, historical changes in respondents’
willingness to disclose same-sex sexuality, or both.
In summary, the data on change are relatively clear: Although therapeutic attempts to change
sexual orientation are not successful, patterns of self-reported same-sex and other-sex attraction
sometimes change on their own, and the overall social climate of visibility and acceptance regarding
same-sex sexuality may be one of the factors influencing such change.
Can Sexual Orientation Be Chosen?
The quality of the scientific evidence regarding choice is substantially weaker, because it is
limited to self-report data on individuals’ personal views of their own sexuality. These perceptions,
although important and informative, are subject to distortion, bias, poor memory, and limited selfknowledge. The most rigorous research on sexual-minority individuals’ perceptions of choice was
collected by Herek, Norton, Allen, and Sims (2010) using a national probability sample of lesbian,
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gay, and bisexual-identified U.S. adults. Similar to the results of earlier studies using
nonrepresentative samples (Diamond, 2008b; Golden, 1994; Whisman, 1996), perceptions of choice
varied markedly across gender and orientation subgroups. In all, 10% of gay men, 30% of lesbians,
and approximately 60% of bisexual men and women reported having some degree of choice in their
sexual orientation.
Of course these data cannot tell us whether individuals are “correct” about having some
choice in their sexuality, given that different individuals have different operationalizations of choice
(Golden, 1994; Whisman, 1996). For example, some individuals have reported that they consciously
decided to think about whether they were capable of a same-sex relationship, and that this choice
fostered the subsequent emergence and flourishing of same-sex attractions (Golden, 1996). Other
individuals have reported that they chose to stop ignoring or discounting their interest in the same
sex, and that once they consciously attended to their feelings they realized that they were sexual
attractions (Diamond, 2008b). It is difficult to interpret such reports: Can intentional shifts in
attention actually give rise to novel experiences of same-sex (or other-sex) desire, or do these
attentional shifts simply foster novel awareness of such desires? This question presumes that
individuals can “have” same-sex desires without being aware of them, which does not fit the
conventional definition of sexual desire as a subjective experience of sexual motivation.
Perhaps a better way to approach the question of choice is to distinguish between one’s
conscious experience of same-sex desire and one’s capacity for same-sex desire. The latter may be a
better operationalization of sexual orientation than the former, but the former is typically the only
way to assess the latter. To get around this obstacle, researchers have used a diverse range of
objective measures, which are outside of respondents’ conscious awareness and therefore difficult to
willfully manipulate, to assess men’s and women’s responses to same-sex and other-sex stimuli,
including neuroimaging, eye tracking, pupil dilation, and genital photoplethysmography (Hamann,
Herman, Nolan, & Wallen, 2004; Rieger, Bailey, & Chivers, 2005; Rieger & Savin-Williams, 2012;
Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2012; Rupp & Wallen, 2007; Savin-Williams, Rieger, &
Rosenthal, 2013). Genital photoplethysmography, which assesses genital arousal by measuring the
magnitude of blood flow to the genitals, is considered by some to be an objective measure of sexual
orientation in men but not in women (Bailey, 2009). Its poor utility for assessing female sexual
orientation stems from the fact that women tend to show “nonspecific” forms of genital arousal. As
shown by Chivers in a groundbreaking series of studies, women show significant genital arousal to
both same-sex and other-sex stimuli, regardless of their self-reported sexual orientation (Chivers,
Rieger, Latty, & Bailey, 2004; Chivers, Seto, & Blanchard, 2007; Chivers & Timmers, 2012).
Does this mean that all women are “really” bisexual without being consciously aware of it?
Not necessarily: Discrepancies between one’s genital arousal to a sexual stimulus and one’s
psychological experience of arousal are common, especially in women, and it is not clear how to
interpret these discrepancies (Bailey, 2009; Bailey, Rieger, & Rosenthal, 2011; Chivers, Seto,
Lalumiere, Laan, & Grimbos, 2010; Rieger et al., 2005; Rosenthal, Sylva, Safron, & Bailey, 2011;
Rosenthal et al., 2012; Suschinsky, Lalumiere, & Chivers, 2009). Further complicating the picture is
the fact that women show more gender-specific genital responses (i.e., greater arousal to their
preferred gender) when sexual stimuli consist of static images of exposed genitals rather than
extended videos of individuals engaged in sexual activity (Bouchard, Timmers, & Chivers, 2015).
These findings underscore a point made earlier: There is no agreed-upon direct measure of sexual
orientation, which makes it impossible to interpret self-reports of “choice” (as well as change) in
sexual orientation.
For the present time, the most accurate summary of the science is that some individuals
perceive a role for choice in their sexual orientation and that we do not know what this means.
Although “choice” is usually presumed to represent the opposite of “biologically based,” no
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evidence actually suggests that individuals reporting a role for choice in their sexual orientation are
less “biologically gay” than those reporting no role for choice. Given that genetic and
neuroendocrine contributions to sexual orientation are not deterministic, one possibility is that a
conscious choice to consider same-sex sexuality is necessary for some individuals’ biological
capacities for same-sex sexuality to become manifest. Even more intriguing, perhaps the only
individuals who can truly choose to be gay (i.e., who can intentionally amplify their experience of
same-sex desire) are those who already possess a biological predisposition for it, even if they were
unaware of this predisposition. Clearly, the simplistic notion of “choice” wielded in public debates
over sexual orientation does not do justice to the complex, variable, and multidimensional nature of
sexual desire as it is manifested in the mind, brain, and body.
The Gap Between Scientific Findings and Public Advocacy
Given the weight of evidence challenging (or at least complicating) the immutability
argument, why does it continue to hold sway in public discourse on sexual-minority rights (as shown
by Stein, 2014)? Some advocates clearly believe that immutability claims are necessary to advocate
effectively for sexual minorities. For example, Sullivan (1995) argued forthrightly that to achieve
equality, sexual minorities had to insist on “the involuntary nature of their condition” (p. 170).
Sullivan’s use of the word condition is notable, given that this word calls to mind the historical view
of homosexuality as a disease, disorder, or biological flaw(reviewed in Money, 1987; Rosario, 2002).
Of course, such views are now widely denounced for their suggestion that homosexuals should be
“cured” or eliminated in the same way that other undesirable groups have been historically target for
extermination (Khan, 2015).
To say the least, nothing is inherently progressive about immutability claims regarding sexual
orientation. And yet, as shown by Stein (2014), the perception that immutability claims are
fundamentally linked to sexual-minority civil rights is so pervasive that public figures who question
immutability arguments are reflexively considered homophobic (e.g., Bradner & Jaffee, 2015;
Copland, 2014; Ford, 2015). Scientists themselves (including the first author) have sometimes
contributed to misconceptions about the immutability of sexual orientation by failing to challenge
and unpack these misconceptions in the media, often to avoid having their statements misused by
antigay activists (see Throckmorten, 2008, 2009).
After all, the stakes of these arguments can be extremely high: In 2013, President Museveni
of Uganda asked scientists to provide him with information on whether sexual orientation is an
immutable, biologically determined trait so that he could decide whether homosexuals deserved to
be punished for their behavior (Throckmorten, 2013). Museveni was considering whether to sign a
law that would strengthen the criminal penalties for homosexuality in Uganda, and he did not think
it would be fair to punish individuals who were born abnormal (BBC News, 2014). More than 200
Western scientists submitted a carefully worded letter to Museveni, arguing that although there was
no single cause of homosexuality, it was influenced by a range of biological factors, and was not a
matter of choice (“Letter to the President of Uganda,” 2014). Nonetheless, Museveni signed the law
in 2014. (Fortunately, the law was later invalidated on technical grounds.) Since that time, the
Academy of Science of South Africa has published its own comprehensive report summarizing the
biological evidence regarding sexual orientation and arguing against the criminalization of same-sex
sexuality (Academy of Science of South Africa, 2015). The authors deployed the same exaggerations
of scientific evidence that have long characterized immutability debates, concluding that “all sexual
orientations are biologically based, largely innate and mostly unchangeable” (p. 22).
In African nations, these debates have dire implications: Same-sex conduct is illegal in 37
African nations and punishable by death in seven. When immutability claims are the only way to
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save lives, it makes both strategic and moral sense for scientists and advocates to highlight scientific
findings that support these claims. Yet in the United States, the social and legal context is obviously
more favorable to sexual-minority rights, and immutability claims are no longer necessary, nor
particularly effective. It is widely believed that individuals will become less prejudiced against sexual
minorities if they come to believe that sexual minorities are “born that way,” but there is little
evidence to this effect. Although individuals who perceive sexual orientation as biologically based
tend to have more positive attitudes toward sexual minorities than those who view sexual orientation
as chosen or socially influenced (Halsam & Levy, 2006; Hegarty & Pratto, 2001; Landén & Innala,
2002; Oldham&Kasser, 1999), it is not clear that born/chosen beliefs actually lead to
acceptance/rejection. The elegant studies of Hegarty and colleagues suggest that individuals do not
become prejudiced against sexual minorities because they view homosexuality as chosen; rather, they
come to endorse notions of homosexuality as chosen as a means of justifying their preexisting
prejudice (Falomir- Pichastor & Hegarty, 2014; Hegarty & Golden, 2008; Hubbard & Hegarty,
2014). This is consistent with research showing that the individuals who are most likely to endorse
notions of homosexuality as chosen are those who have already rejected homosexuality on moral or
religious grounds (Lewis, 2009).
Trying to increase such individuals’ acceptance of homosexuality by convincing them that it
is immutable is unlikely to be effective (as was the case for President Museveni). Moral and religious
beliefs about homosexuality consistently trump “born/chosen” beliefs when predicting attitudes
about sexual-minority civil rights (Reyna, Wetherell, Yantis, & Brandt, 2014), and these moral and
religious beliefs are typically long-standing, deeply held, and unlikely to change on the basis of new
evidence for genetic or neuroendocrine contributions to sexual orientation. Consider, for example,
religious groups that have historically denounced both same-sex attractions and same-sex behavior,
such as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (sometimes called the LDS or Mormon
Church). Over the past decade, the LDS Church has softened its stance toward same-sex attractions,
acknowledging that such attractions are not necessarily chosen, that they may be inborn (at least in
this life), and that they are not sinful in and of themselves (Oaks, 1995; Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 2012). Whether or not this softening reflects increased awareness of the biological
contributions to sexual orientation, it has not changed the Church’s strict condemnation of same-sex
behavior and same-sex relationships, and in fact their punishments for same-sex behavior have
actually grown more severe since the legalization of same-sex marriage (Goodstein, 2015). Hence,
immutability claims may not be as effective as commonly believed in increasing social acceptance of
same-sex sexuality.
This is not to say that these claims have no utility whatsoever. For sexual minorities who do
experience their same-sex sexuality as early-developing and unchanging, immutability arguments may
resonate with their experiences and provide them with a meaningful foundation for their selfacceptance. Also, within highly rejecting contexts (such as a family threatening to disown a gay child
because they view same-sex sexuality as a moral failing), immutability arguments may reduce
rejection and stigma by countering the view of same-sex sexuality as “blameworthy.” As Halley
suggests, immutability arguments respond to anti-gay sentiment with “elegant simplicity and
plangent appeal” (Halley, 1994). By attempting to bracket the morality of homosexuality, they seem
to ask the least of those who oppose it (Sandel, 1989). Rather than ambitiously insisting that “gay is
good” (Feldblum, 2005), immutability arguments claim only that homosexuality is “a normal
expression of human sexuality,” as the Supreme Court asserts (Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015, p. 8).
Yet these examples simply underscore the fact that immutability arguments have more to do with
dueling cultural values than they have to do with science. Not only has the relevant science been
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misrepresented by both sides, but immutability arguments rely on unspoken legal and moral
premises whose validity must be questioned.
Before turning to the role of immutability claims in U.S. legal decisions regarding sexualminority rights, we want to address a question we expect readers may have at this point: If, as we
have argued, scientific research on the causes of sexual orientation is not relevant to debates over
sexual-minority rights, then what sort of science is relevant to these debates, if any? Debating the
overarching role of science (and scientists) in advocacy for sexual-minority civil rights (and civil
rights advocacy more generally) is beyond the scope of our discussion, and we refer readers to the
excellent treatments of this topic elsewhere (Hammack, Mayers, & Windell, 2013; Kitzinger, 1997;
Kitzinger & Coyle, 1995; Warner, 1999). For our part, we concur with Hammack and Windell (2011)
that one of the most indispensable roles for scientific research is to convey the lived experiences of
sexual minorities to lawmakers and judges who may have little firsthand knowledge of these
experiences. Science cannot and should not be the final arbiter of sexual-minority rights, but
research on the origins, development, and experience of same-sex sexuality can and should
contribute to the development and laws and policies that reflect the diverse realities of sexualminority lives.
IMMUTABILITY IS UNNECESSARY

Frontiero v. Richardson: Immutability’s Debut
In the 1938 case United States v. Carolene Products, the Supreme Court laid out a basic
framework for analyzing laws challenged under the Equal Protection Clause. Under this rubric, the
Court warned that “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition,
which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon
to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry”
(United States v. Carolene Products Co., 1938, p. 152). Unfortunately, the Court made no attempt to
identify which minorities were “discrete and insular,” and neither of these terms has been
meaningfully defined in subsequent cases (Ackerman, 1985). During the 1940s, the Court
determined that laws discriminating based on race and national origin were “suspect” and would be
subject to “rigid scrutiny” under the Equal Protection Clause (Korematsu v. United States, 1944).
Under this exacting standard, such laws were deemed unconstitutional except in the rare
circumstance that the state could show they served a “compelling” state interest. Until the 1970s,
however, the Court had still not explained why some classifications were suspect and whether other
classifications would be subjected to the same standard. In the 1973 case Frontiero v. Richardson,
the Court signaled that heightened scrutiny would apply to sex classifications as well. Writing for a
plurality of four justices, Justice Brennan drew a series of analogies between sex and race to explain
why discrimination based on both characteristics should be subject to similar standards of judicial
review (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973). Because Brennan’s opinion marked the debut of
immutability as a legal concept, it remains influential in today’s debates about whether sexual
orientation is immutable. Furthermore, because the opinion lays out several reasons for applying
heightened scrutiny to sex classifications, it is widely referenced to determine the standard for
reviewing discrimination against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.
Yet Brennan’s analogies were not all concerned with the immutability of race and sex. First,
he observed that the nation’s history of sex discrimination paralleled the history of race
discrimination in significant ways, given that, at different historical moments, slaves and women
have both been prohibited from voting, holding office, serving on juries, and so on. Second,
Brennan insisted that women were still being subjected to discrimination in the workplace, in
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educational institutions, and in the political arena partly because of the visibility of the trait of sex.
Only after making these points did Brennan argue that sex, like race, was “an immutable
characteristic determined solely by accident of birth” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 686).
Because these traits bore no relationship to “individual responsibility,” he reasoned, imposing “legal
burdens” based on them was fundamentally unfair (p. 686). Yet he also claimed that sex was
distinguishable from other immutable traits, such as intelligence and physical disability, because sex
was rarely relevant to a person’s ability to perform a job or contribute to society. Based on the
collective strength of these analogies, Brennan concluded that classifications based upon sex—like
those based upon race, alienage, and national origin—were inherently suspect. It is this logic that
advocates for sexual-minority rights have used in recent debates over same-sex marriage: If sexual
orientation represents yet another suspect class, then laws imposing legal burdens on LGB
individuals should be subjected to heightened judicial scrutiny to ensure equal protection of the laws.
In future years, judges, lawyers, and scholars began to develop the legal basis for considering
sexual orientation as a suspect class. Twelve years after Frontiero was decided, the opinion’s author
argued that heightened scrutiny should be applied to laws that discriminate against lesbians, gay men,
and bisexuals. In Rowland v. Mad River Local School District (1985), a high school guidance
counselor named Marjorie Rowland had been suspended solely on the basis of her self-professed
bisexuality. When the Supreme Court refused to hear Rowland’s appeal, Justice Brennan objected,
specifically indicating that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation raised similar equal
protection problems that had been addressed in Frontiero. Yet he did not base this analogy on the
immutability of sexual orientation.
Rather, he emphasized the political disenfranchisement of LGB individuals and their
exposure to forms of hostility and prejudice that had no rational basis (both of which are factors
that courts can consider when evaluating claims of equal protection). For these reasons—and with
no reference to immutability—he concluded that state actions taken against LGB individuals should
be subjected to heightened scrutiny.
The Mutability of Conduct
Brennan’s sweeping proposal to apply heightened scrutiny to laws affecting sexual
orientation was not to be. Just one year after Rowland, the Court decided Bowers v. Hardwick,
which dealt a terrible blow to constitutional claims on behalf of LGB litigants (Bowers v. Hardwick,
1986). In this infamous case, the Court upheld the conviction of Michael Hardwick under Georgia’s
sodomy law for engaging in a private, consensual act of oral sex with another man. Because the law
applied to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct, Hardwick challenged his conviction under
the Due Process Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause—as a violation of his fundamental
rights as an individual, rather than as discrimination against LGB people as a class. Based on a
misreading of the historical record, the Court rejected Hardwick’s claim out of hand, claiming that
laws forbidding sodomy had “ancient” roots and that there could be no legitimate assertion of an
individual’s right to engage in such conduct. Because the law was not subject to heightened scrutiny,
it could be justified by any “rational basis”—including the beliefs of the Georgia electorate that
sodomy was an immoral, unacceptable practice.
Strictly speaking, Bowers was about sexual behavior, not sexual orientation. Because the case
was decided under the Due Process Clause it did not legally foreclose the possibility of heightened
scrutiny for sexual orientation under the Equal Protection Clause. As a practical matter, however,
the door that had once been opened by Frontiero had been slammed shut in Bowers. In 1987 one
court explained that the two issues could not be distinguished, because sexual orientation was
essentially defined by sexual behavior (Padula v. Webster, 1987). The logic went as follows: Because
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one’s status as an LGB individual is based on one’s participation in same-sex behavior, and because
the Supreme Court allows states to criminalize same-sex behavior, then the Court clearly does not
view sexual orientation as a suspect class. If they did, how could they have permitted criminalization
of “the very conduct that defines the class”? Following this logic, several courts rejected the claim
that laws regarding sexual orientation merited the same scrutiny as laws regarding race and sex, for
equal protection purposes, and they further rejected arguments for heightened scrutiny based on the
immutability of sexual orientation.
In 1989 and 1990, courts dismissed equal protection claims by finding that homosexuality
was fundamentally different from race, sex, or alienage because it was essentially behavioral (High
Tech Gays v. Defense Industry Security Clearance Office, 1990). These early cases highlight one
important limitation of immutability claims on behalf of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals: The
immutability argument presumes that sexual orientation can be defined by reference to identity or
attraction, rather than conduct. Yet historically most anti-gay laws have targeted homosexual
behavior—for example, sodomy and marriage—rather than a claim of identity or same-sex
attraction itself. In the late 1980s and early 1990s this definitional gap allowed courts to dismiss
claims about the immutability of sexual orientation on the basis that such claims were legally
irrelevant: Even if sexual orientation was immutable, these courts reasoned, the law did not target
“orientation” per se, only its behavioral manifestations. In 1995 one appeals court explained: “Those
persons who fall within the orbit of legislation concerning sexual orientation are so affected not
because of their orientation but rather by their conduct which identifies them as homosexual,
bisexual, or heterosexual” (Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati v. City of Cincinnati, 1995).
So long as Bowers remained on the books, lower courts continued to define sexual orientation in
behavioral terms—and to reject equal protection challenges brought by lesbians, gay men, and
bisexuals on this basis.
Fortunately, those days are long over. In the past three decades, LGB litigants have racked
up an astonishing number of victories in state and federal courts—including four landmark victories
in the U.S. Supreme Court. These victories might give observers the impression that legal arguments
citing the immutability of sexual orientation have, finally, been successful in securing legal
protections for sexual minorities. Yet this is not the case. Rather, it is remarkable to see just how few
of these victories have depended on the immutability argument. Taking the issue of same-sex
marriage as a case study, we can identify five ways that litigants have commonly prevailed without
relying on the claim that homosexuality is immutable. These alternative strategies support our claim
that the time has finally come for U.S. advocates, lawyers, and scientists to abandon the immutability
argument once and for all.
Winning Without Immutability

It’s Just a Factor. Contrary to the notion that the Equal Protection Clause protects only
groups who share an immutable trait (as argued in McHugh, 2013), the Supreme Court has
historically treated immutability as a factor to be considered rather than a requirement to be fulfilled
(Halley, 1994). Moreover, in some decisions (such as Graham v. Richardson, 1971), the Court has
applied “heightened scrutiny” for equal protection purposes without making any reference to
immutability at all.
Court decisions regarding other stigmatized groups make clear that the immutability of
group membership is not a necessary characteristic for a group to fall under the purview of the
Equal Protection Clause. In 1971 the Court unanimously determined that alienage classifications
were subject to strict scrutiny, just like race and national origin classifications (Graham v.
Richardson, 1971). Alienage is obviously not an immutable trait, given that many noncitizens have
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the opportunity to become naturalized citizens (Gerstmann, 1999). Similarly, the Court has also
applied heightened scrutiny to laws discriminating against children born out of wedlock, even
though such children could be “legitimatized” under many states’ laws (Gerstmann, 1999; Weber v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 1972). In later cases, the Court has specifically asked whether groups
“exhibit obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them” (Bowen v. Gilliard,
1987, p. 602; Lyng v. Castillo, 1988, p. 638). By using the word “or” rather than “and,” the Court
indicated that immutability was not a sine qua non for applying heightened scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.
Finally, the Court has repeatedly found that immutability by itself is not sufficient grounds
for heightened scrutiny. In Frontiero, for example, the Justices observed that laws regarding
intelligence and physical disability did not merit heightened scrutiny—despite the immutability of
these traits —because such traits were often relevant to an individual’s “ability to perform or
contribute to society” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 688), therefore creating a potentially
rational basis for laws regarding these groups. Accordingly, advocates for same-sex marriage in
California, Connecticut, and Iowa have successfully argued that the immutability of sexual
orientation is not required for a characteristic to be considered a suspect classification for equal
protection purposes, and these courts specifically described immutability as a “subsidiary” or
“supplemental” factor for suspect class status, rather than a prerequisite (Kerrigan v. Commission of
Public Health, 2008; Marriage Cases, 2008; Varnum v. Brien, 2009).
In United States v. Windsor, a federal appeals court forcefully rejected the claim that a
finding of immutability was necessary to define a suspect class. Rather than asking whether
homosexuality was immutable, the court asked whether “homosexuality is a sufficiently discernible
characteristic to define a discrete minority class” (Windsor v. United States, 2012, p. 183). Although
the court acknowledged that this consideration is often couched in terms of immutability, it insisted
that the test is broader, focusing on “whether the characteristic of the class calls down
discrimination when it is manifest” (p. 183). Because “sexual preference is necessarily disclosed
when two persons of the same sex apply for a marriage license,” the court found that “sexual
orientation is a sufficiently distinguishing characteristic to identify the discrete minority class of
homosexuals” (p. 184).

Redefining Immutability. Even in court cases where the immutability of sexual orientation
has been invoked to support the rights of LGB individuals, the legal definition of immutability has
been altered in significant ways. In short, the key question is no longer “Can LGB individuals
change their sexual orientation?” but “Should they be impelled to do so?” At this point, the legal
answer is clearly no. In a 1989 case (Watkins v. U.S. Army, 1989), Judge Norris of the Ninth Circuit
argued that the Supreme Court’s notion of immutability, in the context of equal protection claims,
could not mean “strict immutability in the sense that members of the class must be physically unable
to change or mask the trait defining their class” (p. 1347). After all, he reasoned, “People can have
operations to change their sex. Aliens can ordinarily become naturalized citizens. The status of
illegitimate children can be changed” (p. 1347). Taking this analysis a step further, he added that
individuals can also change their social status (as a member of a stigmatized group) by simply hiding
their group membership.
Yet the fact that individuals possess the option to change a stigmatized trait does not mean
that they should have to do so to avoid discrimination. Judge Norris went on to argue that some
traits are “so central to a person’s identity that it would be abhorrent for government to penalize a
person for refusing to change them, regardless of how easy that change
might be” (p. 1347),
and he maintained that this was the most appropriate definition of “immutable” in the Equal
Protection context. By way of example, he continued: “Racial discrimination … would not suddenly
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become constitutional if medical science developed an easy, cheap, and painless method of changing
one’s skin pigment” (p. 1347).
In the past decade, Judge Norris’s redefinition of immutability—from a trait that cannot
change to a trait that is central to a person’s identity—has been widely adopted by state and federal
courts in same-sex marriage cases. In California, Connecticut, and Iowa, the state’s highest courts
expressly invoked Norris’s standard to find that sexual orientation was “immutable” and that
heightened scrutiny therefore applied to laws that discriminate against same-sex couples (Kerrigan v.
Commission of Public Health, 2008; Marriage Cases, 2008; Varnum v. Brien, 2009). More recently,
one federal appeals court adopted his rule, along with several federal district courts that have
invalidated same-sex marriage bans (De Leon v. Perry, 2014; Latta v. Otter, 2014; Love v. Beshear,
2014; Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 2013; Varnum v. Brien, 2009; Whitewood v. Wolf, 2014; Wolf v.
Walker, 2014).
Of course, this new definition of immutability has little to do with Brennan’s original
formulation of immutable traits as those which are determined “solely by accident of birth” and
unrelated to “individual responsibility” (Frontiero v. Richardson, 1973, p. 686). It is not a definition
of immutability at all but a reframing of legal argumentation—from “Can you change?” to “Should
you have to change?” (Schmeiser, 2009; Yoshino, 1998). Hence, even when immutability is invoked
in arguments seeking protection for sexual minority individuals under the Equal Protection Clause,
the legal meaning of immutability has moved far afield from the folk notion of “born that way.”
Notably, this redefinition of immutability from a trait that is unchangeable to a trait that is
central to a person’s identity has its own shortcomings. As noted by Halley (1994), and as we will
discuss further, it potentially excludes from legal protection those individuals who do not consider
their sexual orientation to be a central and fundamental component of their personal identity (a
group that is larger, as we will show, than many might expect). It also leaves open the possibility that
laws penalizing same-sex behavior could be found constitutional because they are not penalizing an
individual’s “personhood” as a sexual minority individual but simply the public expression of that
personhood (similar to the rules established in many religious groups, which allow members of these
groups to openly identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual as long as they agree never to act on their samesex attractions). Finally, as critiqued by Clarke, the “new immutability” presumes that some traits are
more “central” to a person’s identity than others without providing any theoretical justification for
these determinations, and ends up relying on the same implicit moral judgments about
blameworthiness as did the “old” version of immutability (Clarke, 2015). Yet the key issue, for the
present argument, is that even when immutability is successfully invoked to secure legal protections
for sexual minority individuals, it is a strikingly different form of immutability that no longer even
means “unchangeable.”

Sex Discrimination. During the oral arguments in Obergefell, Chief Justice Roberts asked a
surprising question about state laws against same-sex marriage:
Counsel, I’m not sure it’s necessary to get into sexual orientation to resolve the case.
I mean, if Sue loves Joe and Tom loves Joe, Sue can marry him and Tom can’t. And
the difference is based upon their different sex. Why isn’t that a straightforward
question of sexual discrimination? (Transcript of Oral Argument in Obergefell v.
Hodges, 2015, p. 62)
As the Chief Justice suggested, if his argument were adopted, it would sidestep the issue of
whether sexual orientation is immutable, or whether sexual orientation classifications satisfy the
factors articulated in Frontiero. If laws against same-sex marriage discriminate based on sex, then
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they would be subject to heightened scrutiny on that ground. This particular argument was already
familiar to scholars studying the battles over same-sex marriage. In every legal challenge brought
since the 1970s, plaintiffs have argued that laws against same-sex marriage should be subject to
heightened scrutiny because they discriminate based on sex. In the 1973 case Singer v. Hara, for
example, two male plaintiffs claimed that if Washington’s marriage law were construed to permit a
man to marry a woman but not a man, then it would establish a classification based exclusively on
sex which should be subject to heightened scrutiny under the Washington Constitution’s Equal
Rights Amendment. In response, the state argued that the law did not discriminate based on sex
because it applied equally to both sexes (i.e., just as men were forbidden to marry men, women were
forbidden to marry women). The Singer court upheld the marriage law, reasoning that because the
plaintiffs were members of the same sex, “what they propose is not a marriage” (Singer v. Hara,
1974, p. 1192).
Although the sex discrimination argument was rejected in Singer, it was responsible for the
first victory for same-sex marriage in an appellate court. In the 1993 case Baehr v. Lewin, a plurality
of the Hawai’ i Supreme Court issued the first opinion adopting the sex discrimination argument in a
same-sex marriage case (Baehr v. Lewin, 1993). Like the plaintiffs in Singer, the Baehr plurality
reasoned that by limiting marriage to male-female couples, the state’s law had established a
classification that discriminated on the basis of the applicants’ sex and was therefore subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Hawaii Constitution’s Equal Rights Amendment.
The underlying logic of the equal protection argument is inherently compelling. By
definition, the concept of sexual orientation depends on the concept of sex (one’s own sex
combined with the sex of individuals to whom one is attracted). Because it is impossible to make
distinctions based on sexual orientation without making distinctions based on sex, every act of
discrimination based on sexual orientation can be defined as sex discrimination. This logical
relationship is especially clear in the case of laws against same-sex marriage; although such laws are
intended to discriminate against gay men and lesbians, they achieve this result by classifying couples
based on sex.
In recent years, same-sex marriage advocates have bolstered the sex discrimination argument
by documenting the historical connection between discrimination against women and discrimination
against lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals —especially in the domain of marriage (Case, 2010). Until
the late nineteenth century, marriage laws imposed sexbased roles on husbands and wives. Under
the doctrine of coverture, married women were denied the ability to enter contracts, own property,
or maintain custody of children upon divorce. Once these inequalities were abolished, legal marriage
became the union of two equal partners. Under this regime, as one judge explained, the exclusion of
same-sex couples from marriage is nothing more than an “artifact of a time when the genders were
seen as having distinct roles in society and in marriage” (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010, p. 993).
Over the years, this argument has proved only modestly successful: Although numerous
plaintiffs have challenged the constitutionality of laws against same-sex marriage by arguing that
such laws represent sex discrimination, only a handful of trial and appellate judges have accepted this
argument. In 2013, however, Justice Kennedy breathed new life into the sex discrimination
argument. During oral arguments over the constitutionality of California’s Proposition 8, he
remarked that the issue of whether Prop 8 “can be treated as a gender-based classification … [is] a
difficult question that I’ ve been trying to wrestle with” (“Transcript of Oral Argument in Perry v.
Hollingsworth,” 2013, p. 13). Given that Kennedy was widely expected to cast the swing vote on
same-sex marriage, his remark was carefully noted and deployed by litigants and lower court judges
in subsequent cases. In the next marriage case to be decided, a federal judge held that Utah’s ban
against same-sex marriage was subject to heightened scrutiny because, among other things, the law
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was “drawn according to sex” (Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013, p. 1206). As a result, the judge had no
need to decide whether sexual orientation was an immutable trait (p. 1207).

Casting Moral Disapproval as Animus. Religious, moral, and social disapproval of
homosexuality have long been used as justifications for laws prohibiting same-sex sexual behavior
(Bowers v. Hardwick, 1986; Eskridge, 2008). Since 1996, however, the Supreme Court has been
rejecting this justification, casting moral disapproval as a form of antigay animus, rather than a
legitimate state interest. This approach makes it unnecessary to determine whether sexual orientation
is a suspect class (on the basis of its immutability or other criteria), as it removes the rational basis
for laws that discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation.
For example, in the 1996 case Romer v. Evans the Supreme Court struck down a law that
discriminated against LGB people under the Equal Protection Clause. The law in Romer was an
amendment to the Colorado Constitution known as Amendment 2. Titled “No Protected Status
Based on Homosexual, Lesbian, or Bisexual Orientation,” the law provided that sexual orientation
(whether defined in terms of identity or behavior) could not serve as a basis for any claims of
discrimination. In effect, the law repealed a number of existing laws that had protected LGB people
from discrimination in housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and
welfare services, and it barred any state or municipal entity from adopting such laws in the future. In
defending this law, Colorado principally argued that it would protect the liberty of employers or
landlords with personal objections to homosexuality from having to associate with LGB individuals.
In striking down Amendment 2, the Court declined to say whether all classifications based
on sexual orientation were suspect, and thus whether they would be subject to heightened scrutiny
under the Equal Protection Clause. Because the Court found that Amendment 2 could not even
satisfy “rational basis review”—the most deferential standard of judicial review—it was not
necessary to determine whether a more demanding standard should be applied. Because the law
“identifies persons by a single trait and then denies them protection across the board,” it was “at
once too narrow and too broad” (p. 633). As a result of this “peculiar property,” the Court reasoned,
the law was “unprecedented in our jurisprudence” and “inexplicable by anything but animus toward
the class it affects” (pp. 632– 633). Quoting an earlier ruling, the Court explained: “[I]f the
constitutional conception of ‘equal protection of the laws’ means anything, it must at the very least
mean that a bare … desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate
governmental interest” (p. 634).
In the 2003 case Lawrence v. Texas, the Court’s rejection of moral objections to
homosexuality was more explicit. The law at issue in Lawrence was a Texas statute that criminalized
“deviate” sexual intercourse (specifically, anal sex) between persons of the same sex. To justify the
law, Texas argued that it was rationally related to “the legitimate governmental interest [in the]
promotion of morality” (Respondent’s Brief, “Respondent’s Brief, Lawrence v. Texas, 2003”, p.
42)—the same interest that the Supreme Court had invoked to justify the sodomy law upheld in
Bowers. After criticizing the historical grounds relied upon in Bowers, the Court acknowledged that
although many individuals—over hundreds of years—have expressed powerful and deeply held
moral objections to homosexuality, this was not a sufficient justification for criminalizing it, and
thereby intruding into citizens’ private behavior: “[T]he fact that the governing majority in a State
has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a sufficient reason for upholding a law
prohibiting the practice” (pp. 577– 578).
Shortly after Lawrence was decided, the one-two punch of Romer and Lawrence produced a
landmark same-sex marriage ruling in Massachusetts. In Goodridge v. Department of Public Health
(2003), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court struck down the state’s law against same-sex
marriage under the state constitution’s equal protection and due process provisions. Relying on both
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Romer and Lawrence, the Massachusetts court found that the state’s law failed rational basis review.
As a result, the court did not need to address whether homosexuality was immutable, or whether
discrimination based on sexual orientation was subject to a more demanding standard.
Finally, in the 2013 case United States v. Windsor, the Supreme Court struck down the
Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA), a federal law that defined marriage as a legal union between one
man and one woman. Once again, the Court had an opportunity to say whether laws such as
DOMA that discriminated against LGB people were subject to heightened scrutiny under equal
protection principles, on the grounds of immutability or other criteria. As noted earlier, several
amicus curiae briefs specifically took up this issue, arguing both for (Vargas & O’Donnell, 2013) and
against (McHugh, 2013) the immutability of homosexuality. Yet as in Romer and Lawrence, the
Court avoided these issues, invalidating DOMA on more modest grounds. Echoing Romer, the
Windsor decision emphasized that discrimination could not be justified by “a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group” (p. 2693). With unusual candor, the Court declared
that DOMA was based on nothing more than “improper animus”—indeed, a desire to “injure”
same-sex couples by imposing a stigma on them (p. 2693). In doing so, the Court explicitly rejected
Congress’s attempts to offer moral justifications for the law, such as the claims that DOMA
reflected “a moral conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional (especially JudeoChristian) morality” and “an interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in
heterosexualonly marriage laws” (p. 2693). Closely tracking the holding of Lawrence, the Court again
found that “no legitimate purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure
those whom the State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect” (p. 2696).
In short, these decisions demonstrate that a more effective (and frankly, more logical)
strategy for fighting anti-gay laws is to focus on their “anti” intent. As the Court has ruled, laws that
seek to injure, stigmatize, or marginalize a group of people—even on the basis of deeply held moral
convictions—are impermissible, regardless of the characteristics of the group targeted by the law.

“You’re Harming Our Kids!” In United States v. Windsor, the defenders of “traditional”
marriage trotted out a familiar argument in support of DOMA. Among other things, they claimed
that the law was justified by the government’s interest in promoting child rearing by both a mother
and a father. Because of “the different challenges faced by boys and girls as they grow to
adulthood,” they reasoned, it was “at least rational to think that children benefit from having
parental role models of both sexes” (Brief on the Merits for Respondent the Bipartisan Legal
Advisory Group of the U.S. House of Representatives, United States v. Windsor, 2013, p. 48).
Yet in striking down DOMA, the Supreme Court ruled that the law actually harmed
children, rather than benefiting them. In addition to finding that the law “injure[s],” “disparage[s],”
and “demean[s]” same-sex couples, the Court declared that DOMA “humiliates tens of thousands of
children now being raised by same-sex couples” (United States v. Windsor, 2013, p. 2694). The
Court added that “DOMA also brings financial harm to children of same-sex couples” by raising
“the cost of health care for families” and denying “benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a
spouse and parent” (p. 2694). This argument, too, does not depend on any claim that homosexuality
is immutable —or more broadly, on the application of heightened scrutiny to laws that discriminate
against LGB people. It depends only on the recognition that some same-sex couples are raising
children. Once this fact is acknowledged, it follows that laws targeting same-sex couples harm these
children.
It is difficult to overstate the significance of this particular turn in the trajectory of the
LGBT movement. For many decades, courts had presumed that the government had a legitimate
interest in shielding children from any exposure to homosexuality—most notably, to prevent
children from becoming lesbian, gay, or bisexual themselves. In the name of protecting children
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from concerns about seduction, indoctrination, and role modeling, opponents of LGB rights such as
Anita Bryant had defended a broad range of policies that discriminated against LGB people. Yet the
Court’s analysis in Windsor provides a new and powerful response to the claim that anti-gay laws —
especially those that prohibit same-sex marriage—seek to protect children: Advocates, lawyers, and
scientists can now effectively argue that the children who need protection are the children of LGB
individuals, who are harmed and humiliated by laws that codify anti-gay animus.

The Liberty to Choose. In Lawrence, the Supreme Court struck down the Texas sodomy
law under the Due Process Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause. In doing so, the Court
opened up yet another path around the immutability argument, by establishing each individual’s
liberty to choose same-sex relations and relationships. Throughout the proceedings, the two men
had challenged their sodomy convictions under both the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause—as a form of discrimination against gay and lesbian people as well as an infringement on an
individual’s liberty to engage in private consensual sexual behavior. Rather than deciding the case
under the Equal Protection Clause—and thus leaving the holding of Bowers untouched—the
Lawrence Court clearly stated that it was deciding the case under the Due Process Clause.
Analogizing the men’s claim to the liberty interests protected in the Court’s reproductive freedom
cases involving abortion and contraceptives, the Court emphasized that the Texas sodomy law
sought “to control a personal relationship that … is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals” (Lawrence v. Texas, 2003, p. 567). From this perspective, the
immutability of the men’s desire to engage in same-sex contact was irrelevant. Accordingly, the
Court made no reference to immutability, instead referring repeatedly to the themes of liberty,
freedom, and choice: “It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this
relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons…. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to
make this choice” (p. 567; emphasis added).
In subsequent cases, lower courts have applied Lawrence to recognize that laws against
same-sex marriage violate an individual’s right to marry, which the Supreme Court has long
recognized as a fundamental right protected by the Due Process Clause. In 2008, the California
Supreme Court applied Lawrence in holding that California’s law against same-sex marriage violated
“the right of an individual to establish a legally recognized family with the person of one’s choice”
(Marriage Cases, 2008, p. 423). More recently, in Kitchen v. Herbert, a federal appeals court applied
Lawrence in holding that Utah’s law against same-sex marriage violated the fundamental right to
marry—specifically, the “freedoms—to choose one’s spouse, to decide whether to conceive or
adopt a child, to publicly proclaim an enduring commitment to remain together through thick and
thin” (Kitchen v. Herbert, 2013, p. 1212). These rulings show the viability of arguments for samesex marriage that focus on the fundamental right to choose one’s marriage partner, rather than one’s
inability to change one’s same-sex desires.
For the most part, the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Obergefell offered a ringing
endorsement of an individual’s liberty to choose same-sex relationships. Above all, the Court
emphasized that “the right to marry is fundamental under the Due Process Clause” because “the
right to personal choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy”
(Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). Drawing upon earlier rulings, the Court analogized the freedom to
marry with other liberties protected by the Due Process Clause: Like choices concerning
contraception, family relationships, procreation, and child rearing, “decisions concerning marriage
are among the most intimate that an individual can make” (p. 12; emphasis added). Because the
freedom to marry resides “with the individual,” the Court explained, “[t]his is true for all persons,
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whatever their sexual orientation” (p. 13). Summarizing this analysis, the Court concluded: “There is
no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to this principle” (p. 17).
In light of this reasoning, it was both puzzling and pointless that the Obergefell decision also
stated that “sexual orientation is … immutable” (p. 8) and that the “immutable nature” of the
petitioners “dictates that same-sex marriage is their only real path to [the] profound commitment”
that marriage involves (p. 4). If every person has the “autonomy to make such profound choices” (p.
13), then why should the reasons underlying those choices matter? One man seeking to marry a
same-sex partner may feel that he was born with a gay orientation and had “no choice” but to fall in
love with a man. Another man might feel that although he did not choose his bisexual attractions, he
actively chose to pursue relationships with men instead of relationships with women. Do laws
against same-sex marriage violate the freedom of gay men more than the freedom of bisexuals (see
Boucai, 2012)?
Given that the Supreme Court ultimately ruled in favor of same-sex marriage, one might
wonder whether the Court’s casual, scientifically inaccurate references to immutability really matter,
especially given that they were not invoked as the primary basis for the judgment itself. In other
words, now that same-sex marriage is legal for everyone, what is the harm if the Supreme Court has
a view of sexual orientation that is several decades out of date? We are not worried that after
Obergefell county clerks will require same-sex couples to prove that they were “born that way” or
deny them marriage licenses if they fail to do so. But the Court’s opinion is a social artifact as well as
a legal ruling—a widely read text that may influence how LGB people are perceived by others, and
how they perceive and present themselves (Halley, 1998). In this sense, the Court’s cryptic reference
to immutability is not only gratuitous but actually harmful. It implicitly presumes that homosexuality
is inferior to heterosexuality, and it symbolically excludes certain subsets of the sexual minority
population from the very freedoms and relationships that Obergefell purports to protect. This is the
argument we take up next.
IMMUTABILITY IS UNJUST
The final and crucial reason to set aside immutability-based arguments for sexual-minority
rights is that they misrepresent and marginalize those sexual minorities who experience their
sexuality as chosen, nonexclusive, or variable, implying that these individuals are somehow less
deserving of legal protection than sexual minorities who experience their sexuality as fixed,
exclusive, and essential. Also, by making the claim that sexual minorities cannot be held not
“responsible” for their status, immutability arguments signal fundamental agreement with the
historical denigration of same-sex sexuality as inherently inferior to heterosexuality.
Who Deserves Equal Treatment?
If the immutability of sexual orientation is used as the basis for civil rights claims on behalf
of sexual minorities, then what happens to the legal and social identities of individuals whose samesex sexuality does not appear to be immutable? The two types of sexual minorities who are most
marginalized and disenfranchised by immutability arguments are bisexual individuals and those who
experience their sexuality as variable and/or chosen.
Individuals with bisexual patterns of attraction and behavior have always posed a problem
for immutability claims, especially as these claims have been applied to the same-sex marriage debate
(Boucai, 2012). As reviewed by Halley (1994), courts have interpreted arguments about the
immutability of sexual orientation to be irrelevant to the “great in between” occupied by bisexuals
(p. 515), reflecting the widespread view that individuals who possess attractions to both men and
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women necessarily have some degree of choice over which relationships to pursue (a view which
some—but not all—bisexuals share, as shown by Herek et al., 2010). As Halley (1994) warned,
“[T]he fairness theory of pro-gay essentialism does not explain why bisexuals—by hypothesis
capable of satisfactory sexual encounters with members of the so-called ‘opposite’ sex—should not
be encouraged or forced to do so” (p. 528), and she further warned that this particular problem with
the immutability argument would only get worse as bisexual movements and communities began to
grow.
Her words seem unusually prescient now: At the time of her writing, in the early 1990s,
bisexual identities and communities were relatively novel phenomena, lacking the size, political
power, and visibility of the conventional lesbian/ gay community. Twenty years later, social and
scientific c awareness of bisexuality, and the development of bisexual communities and advocacy
groups, has increased substantially. Although it is commonly thought that bisexuals face less social
marginalization than gays and lesbians because they have access to the privileges associated with
heterosexual relationships, this does not appear to be the case: To the contrary, bisexuals face
widespread suspicion, dismissal, misunderstanding, and denigration from both mainstream society
and the lesbian/gay community (Balsam & Mohr, 2007; Callis, 2013; Kaestle & Ivory, 2012; WelzerLang & Tomolillo, 2008; Yost & Thomas, 2012), and this pervasive stigmatization may account for
the fact that bisexually attracted and bisexually behaving individuals report higher levels of stressrelated mental health problems (such as anxiety, depression, and substance use) than individuals with
exclusively same-sex attractions or behavior (Diamond, Butterworth, & Savin-Williams, 2010;
Dodge & Sandfort, 2007; Gorman, Denney, Dowdy, & Medeiros, 2015).
The fact that bisexually attracted individuals can choose to form relationships with either
other-sex or same-sex partners remains a key reason for the animus directed toward them, given that
the specter of “choice” has been used as a tool to undermine the rights of sexual minorities. If, as
Sullivan (1995) argued, sexual minorities must secure their rights by convincing the public that they
bear no responsibility for their “condition,” then the very existence of bisexuals threatens that
strategy: Even if bisexual attractions are just as immutable as exclusive same-sex attractions, the
inherent possibility for choice in the behavior of bisexuals undercuts the immutability approach
(Yoshino, 2000). The very moment that a bisexual man makes a decision about whether to pursue a
same-sex partner versus an other-sex partner, he conceivably bears some degree of responsibility for
any resulting marginalization. Although he may not have chosen to be bisexual, he chose what to do
about it, and can therefore be held liable for making the wrong choice. Note that when we refer to
“pursuing same-sex partners,” we denote conscious decisions to act on same-sex attractions (and
romantic attachments) by entering into sexual or romantic relationships, and we do not imply that
individuals can consciously control the experience of falling in love, or the degree to which they find
one relationship more satisfying and fulfilling than another.
Boucai (2012) has eloquently argued that bisexuals actually have more to lose than lesbians
and gay men in the face of laws which incentivize certain relationships over others. Specifically,
because bisexuals can choose to pursue either same-sex or other-sex relationships, their lives and
relationships are the most effectively coerced and channeled by laws recognizing other-sex marriage
but not same-sex marriage. According to this compelling logic, bisexuals present the most clear-cut
case of state interference into one of the most personal and private decisions in one’s life: not just
whether to marry, but whom. Boucai’s argument draws on Adrienne Rich’s (1980) famous notion of
“compulsory heterosexuality.” Rich argued that women’s “choices” to pursue heterosexual
relationships were fundamentally enforced by social norms privileging heterosexuality, positing it as
natural, attaching economic resources to it, and punishing women for deviating from it. In essence,
when there is such a huge discrepancy between the social and economic costs and benefits of samesex versus other-sex relationships, the choice of an other-sex over a same-sex partner is never a free
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choice. Immutability-based strategies for sexual-minority rights are incapable of critiquing and
dismantling this DIAMOND AND ROSKY 380 Downloaded by [University of Utah] at 15:57 15
July 2016 form of social control: How can one protect bisexuals’ ability to choose same-sex partners
if one fails to acknowledge that such choices are possible? Immutability strategies for sexualminority rights do not account for the unique experiences of individuals with bisexual attractions.
This weakness would be important even if there were only a handful of bisexually attracted
individuals in the overall sexual minority population, but its implications are magnified by the fact
that there are far more bisexuals in the population than most people think, rendering their exclusion
from immutability arguments even more egregious.
The Invisible Majority
Although many scholars of sexuality such as Freud (1920) have suggested that humans are
innately bisexual, modern sexuality research has generally considered bisexuals to be a small, “fringe”
part of the sexual minority population, presumably made up of individuals who were in the process
of transitioning to a gay or lesbian identity or individuals who were temporarily experimenting with
same-sex relationships (Diamond, 2008a; Rust, 1993, 2000a). From this perspective, exclusive
homosexuality represents the modal form of same-sex sexuality and bisexuality constitutes an
exception. Up until the 1990s, there was little reason to doubt this view, given that the majority of
research conducted on sexual minority populations recruited participants through openly LGB
organizations, events, businesses, and newspapers, all of which tended to underrepresent bisexually
identified men and women.
Today scientists realize how these strategies have distorted our perceptions of the bisexual
population, now that we have access to large-scale, random, and representative data on the
distribution of same-sex sexuality in the United States and other nations. Quite simply, individuals
with bisexual attractions are not “exceptions” within the sexual-minority populations, but the most
common type of sexual minority. To be sure, many of these individuals do not openly identify as
bisexual; some identify as lesbian and gay, some as heterosexual, and some adopt no sexual identity
label at all (reflecting, as discussed earlier, the widespread discordance among the domains of
attraction, behavior, and identity within the sexual-minority population). But studies assessing
patterns of sexual attraction (as opposed to identity or behavior) consistently show that individuals
with a capacity for bisexual attractions outnumber individuals with exclusive same-sex attractions
(Chandra, Mosher, Copen, & Sionean, 2011; Gates, 2011; Hayes et al., 2012; Laumann, Gagnon,
Michael, & Michaels, 1994; Mosher, Chandra, & Jones, 2005; Savin-Williams, 2006). For example,
one large-scale representative study of American adults (Mosher et al., 2005) found that 6% of
American men and nearly 13% of American women reported attractions to both sexes, whereas
1.5% of men and.8% of women were exclusively attracted to the same sex (the same basic pattern
emerged in Chandra et al., 2011). In the fourth wave of the National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent Health (when participants were in early adulthood), 6.4% of men and nearly 20% of
women reported same-sex attractions, and of these individuals, only 5% of the same-sex attracted
women and 26% of the same-sex attracted men reported that these attractions were exclusively
directed to the same sex.
Similar results have been found internationally: A probability sample of approximately 4,000
British adults found that 5.1% of men and 6% women reported a same-sex attractions; of these
individuals, only 10% of the women and 20% of the men described their attractions as exclusively
same-sex (Hayes et al., 2012). In a large cohort study of New Zealanders, 5.6% of men and 15.9% of
women reported same-sex attraction; of these individuals, 5% of the women and 21% of the men
described their attractions as exclusively same-sex (Dickson et al., 2003). In a representative
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probability sample of nearly 6,000 American adults, 7.8% of men and 6.8% claimed to be
nonheterosexual; of these individuals, two-thirds of the men but only 14% of the women claimed to
be exclusively gay/lesbian (Herbenick et al., 2010). In a nationally representative survey of more
than 33,000 men and women, 1.5% of men and 1.4% of women identified as nonheterosexual; of
these individuals, 78% of the men but only 42% of the women considered themselves exclusively
gay or lesbian (Sweet & Welles, 2012). In a representative study of nearly 3,500 Swedish youth (17 to
18 years of age), only 3% of the same-sex-attracted women and 11% of the same-sexattracted men
considered themselves exclusively gay (Priebe & Svedin, 2013). Among a representative schoolbased
sample of nearly 4,000 youth in Canada, only 6% of the same-sex-attracted girls and 25% of the
same-sexattracted boys described their attractions as exclusively same sex (Busseri, Willoughby,
Chalmers, & Bogaert, 2006). These findings challenge the conventional wisdom that individuals with
exclusive same-sex attractions represent the prototypical “type” of sexual minority individual, and
that those with bisexual patterns of attraction are infrequent exceptions. In most studies, the
opposite appears to be true: among individuals with same-sex attractions, individuals with
nonexclusive patterns of attraction are indisputably the “norm,” and those with exclusive same-sex
attractions are the exception.
Perhaps most interesting of all, a range of studies has revealed that the single largest
subgroup of individuals with same-sex attractions, among both women and men, is comprised of
individuals who consider themselves “mostly but not completely heterosexual” (Savin-Williams &
Vrangalova, 2013). These individuals have historically received almost no research attention, and
they certainly do not fit anyone’s stereotype of the type of sexual minority who has been harmed by
the historical unavailability of same-sex marriage. Of course, identifying this population is difficult
because few large-scale studies bother to ask heterosexually identified respondents whether they ever
experience same-sex attraction. Yet the studies that have done so provide a fascinating perspective
on “hidden” bisexual attractions and behavior among heterosexually identified adolescents and
adults. For example, a random representative sample of more than 12,000 New Zealanders over age
16 found that 3% of the respondents who considered themselves to be heterosexual reported having
had same-sex sexual experiences (Wells, McGee, & Beautrais, 2011). A representative survey of
7,403 adult men and women in the United Kingdom found that 1% of those who considered
themselves completely heterosexual had engaged in same-sex sexual behavior (Chakraborty,
McManus, Brugha, Bebbington, & King, 2011). A representative school-based sample of nearly
2,000 high school students in Quebec found that 5% of the youth who considered themselves
heterosexual reported experiencing same-sex attractions and 2% reported same-sex behavior. A
representative sample of more than 3,000 Swedish high school students (Priebe & Svedin, 2013)
found that 13% of the heterosexually identified boys and 30% of the heterosexually identified girls
reported some degree of same-sex attraction (1% of the heterosexual boys and 2% of the
heterosexual girls also reported same-sex sexual behavior). The National Epidemiologic Survey of
Alcohol and Related Conditions collected data on sexuality from a representative sample of more
than 34,000 adults and found that 2% of the heterosexually identified respondents reported samesex attractions and 1% reported same-sex behavior (Sweet & Welles, 2012). Pooled representative
data from multiple administrations of the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, yielding a combined sample
of more than 50,000 adolescents, found that 5% of heterosexually identified youths reported having
had same-sex sexual partners prior to age 18 (Mustanski, Birkett, et al., 2014).
In light of such findings, researchers studying sexual orientation have recently begun to
devote more systematic attention to bisexual patterns of attraction and behavior, whether they occur
among bisexual-identified, heterosexual-identified, or gay/lesbian-identified individuals. However,
such studies remain woefully underrepresented in the overall research literature on sexual
orientation. For example, a recent search of the peer-reviewed social science literature found that
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from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s only 1% of journal articles focusing on sexual orientation or
sexual minority individuals had the word bisexual in the title, and only 9% contained the word in the
abstract. Between 1994 and 2005, these percentages increased to 14% and 35%, respectively, and
during the past decade they have increased to 20% and 55%. Echoing this scientific omission,
bisexuals have also received little attention in legal scholarship on sexual minority rights. As argued
by Yoshino (2000), bisexuals have faced systematic “erasure” from legal and political discourse
about sexual minority rights, and he maintains that this erasure has been maintained for strategic
reasons, most notably to stabilize the existing categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality and to
maintain cultural norms of monogamy. Hence, bisexuals have been altogether absent from both
scientific and legal discourses about the immutability of sexual orientation and its relevance to sexual
minority rights.
Individuals who openly claim to have chosen their same-sex sexuality represent another
group that is misrepresented and marginalized by the immutability approach for sexual-minority
rights. Both scientists and laypeople commonly claim that same-sex sexuality is rarely or never
chosen (e.g., American Psychological Association, 2008; Ghose, 2015), and individuals who claim
otherwise (or who imply the capacity for choice by using terms such as sexual preference instead of
sexual orientation) are often interpreted as misguided, insensitive, or homophobic (Bering, 2013;
Burnett, 2015).
Yet similar to bisexuals, individuals who perceive that they have some choice in their samesex sexuality are more numerous than most people think. As noted earlier, a recent survey
conducted by Herek and colleagues (2010) found that 10% of gay men, 30% of lesbians, and
approximately 60% of bisexuals reported having some degree of choice in their sexuality. These data
are often summarized as evidence that the majority of gays and lesbians do not feel that they chose
their sexual orientation, but such a summary overlooks the obvious finding that a majority of
bisexuals do feel they have some choice. It is not surprising that the reports of the bisexuals are
downplayed, given that claims of choice are perceived to be damaging to immutability arguments for
sexual minority rights. This perception is so well-entrenched that the LGBT community has openly
scolded individuals who describe their own sexuality as chosen. For example, actress Cynthia Nixon,
who developed a committed relationship with a woman in her 40s after an exclusively heterosexual
history, faced widespread skepticism from the LGBT community for openly claiming to “prefer”
same-sex sexuality: “I gave a speech recently, an empowerment speech to a gay audience, and it
included the line ‘I’ve been straight and I’ve been gay, and gay is better.’ And they tried to get me to
change it, because they said it implies that homosexuality can be a choice. And for me, it is a choice.
I understand that for many people it’s not, but for me it’s a choice, and you don’t get to define my
gayness for me … let us stop trying to make a litmus test for who is considered gay and who is
not…. Why can’t it be a choice? Why is that any less legitimate?” (qtd. in Witchel, 2012).
There is a long history to the notion of a “litmus test” for sexual orientation, in which some
sexual minorities are considered to be more “authentically” gay (and hence more deserving of legal
protections) than others. From a scientific perspective, researchers have historically contrasted
“constitutional” same-sex sexuality, theoretically attributable to an intrinsic predisposition for the
same sex, with “facultative” or “opportunistic” same-sex sexuality, theoretically attributable to
reduced opportunities for othersex contact, prolonged sex segregation, curiosity, confusion, or
experimentation (Bell, Weinberg, & Hammersmith, 1981; Money, 1988; Muscarella, 1999).
Constitutional same-sex attractions are presumed to be exclusive, early developing, and
longitudinally stable, whereas facultative same-sex attractions are presumed to be unstable and
situationally variable. Laypeople, too, commonly make these distinctions. For example, women who
pursue same-sex activity in the relatively tolerant environment of college but resume exclusive
heterosexual behavior afterward are jokingly called “LUGs,” or “lesbians until graduation” (Davis,
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2000; Kyrakanos, 1998; Rimer, 1993), and are dismissed as curious heterosexuals rather than
authentic lesbians. The lesbian community has also historically distinguished between primary/born
lesbians, whose same-sex sexuality is presumed to be more inborn and exclusive, and elective/
bisexual/political lesbians, whose same-sex sexuality is presumed more environmentally influenced
and more bisexual (Burch, 1993; Golden, 1994; Ponse, 1978). In fact, the highest social regard
within some lesbian communities has historically been granted to “gold star lesbians”—those who
have never had sexual contact with a man (Queen, 1999; Whisman, 1993). At the opposite end of
the spectrum, presumably, are heterosexually identified women who “perform” bisexuality in public
settings to garner male attention (Fahs, 2009).
Clearly, both scientists and laypeople have observed that there are different types of sexual
minorities, with different sexual developmental histories, different ratios of same-sex to other-sex
attractions, different degrees of longitudinal stability in their attractions, and different perceptions
regarding their capacity for sexual choice. Scientists studying sexual orientation do not know
whether these differences correspond to differences in the causal pathways underlying same-sex
sexuality (reviewed in Diamond, 2013; Diamond & Wallen, 2011). For example, there is no evidence
that someone with exclusive same-sex attractions is more “biologically gay” than someone with
bisexual attractions. The reasons underlying diversity in the manifestations of same-sex sexuality are
interesting and important from a scientific perspective, but they should be irrelevant as a matter of
constitutional law. If an individual seeking to marry a same-sex partner is denied the right to do so, it
matters little whether it is his first same-sex relationship or his 50th, whether he became aware of his
same-sex attractions at age 10 or age 30, or whether he feels that his same-sex sexuality is innate or
chosen. All that matters, from the perspective of civil rights, is whether he has the right to marry the
partner of his choice.
When advocates for sexual-minority rights use the immutability of sexual orientation as a
basis for protection from discrimination, they implicitly convey that the rights of some sexual
minorities—the early-developing, exclusive, “gold star” types—are more deserving of protection
than are others. Yet in the prescient words of Halley (1994), “[A]n adequate legal theory should
protect the entire social class on whose behalf it is articulated” (p. 528). Individuals with complex,
nonexclusive, unpredictable, confusing, or atypical patterns of same-sex and other-sex sexuality may
face skepticism and marginalization from the broader LGBT community, but they deserve the same
respect for their lives and relationships. As posited by Patricia Neal Warren (2009), “Shouldn’t there
be equal power and dignity for us in ‘choosing’ our orientation, rather than being assigned an
orientation by chance?”
Such arguments are increasingly taken up under the banner of queer identity and queer
theory. Although not a monolithic term, queer is typically used to signal a fundamental questioning
and disruption of sexual categories and hierarchies, and to acknowledge the dynamic and flexible
nature of sexuality (Butler, 1990; Duggan, 2006; Horner, 2007; Lovaas, Elia, & Yep, 2007; Owens,
1998; Plummer, 2005, 2007; Rosky, 2013a; Sedgwick, 1990). Some research suggests that younger
generations of sexual minorities are increasingly likely to describe their sexual identities as “queer” or
to desist from sexual identity labels entirely (Savin-Williams, 2005). Other studies find that although
younger cohorts of sexual-minority youth continue to adopt traditional identities such as lesbian,
gay, or bisexual, they do so more critically and strategically than previous generations,
acknowledging that such terms provide only a partial perspective on the complexity of their lived
experiences (Russell, Clarke, & Clary, 2009). If these historical shifts continue, we can expect that
future generations of sexual minorities will increasingly use and perceive the terms lesbian, gay, and
bisexual as heuristics, or mental “rules of thumb,” rather than natural types. Individuals adopting
this critical stance to sexual orientation and identity are likely to find immutability arguments
inherently regressive, in that they reinforce the notion of natural, essential distinctions between
30

THE JOURNAL OF SEX RESEARCH, 53(4-5), 363–391 (2016)
heterosexuals and homosexuals, rather than challenging the very existence of natural sexual
categories.
Immutability arguments also fail to adequately serve the interests of sexual minorities from
ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds that do not share the contemporary Western
conceptualization of sexual orientation as a defining status designation. Such individuals may believe
that their status as an ethnic or religious minority is more critical to their sense of selfhood than their
status as a sexual minority, and that being “born Hawaiian” or “born Catholic” trumps being “born
bisexual.” Some research suggests that the “multiple marginalization” experiences of sexual and
ethnic minorities lend themselves to more fluid and flexible notions of identity that can shift in
response to changing social and community contexts (Chun & Singh, 2010). Valdes (1997) has
argued that the “ethnicization” of sexual orientation within legal and political discourse (i.e., the
treatment of sexual orientation as a discrete and permanent trait akin to ethnicity, as discussed by
Kimmel, 1993) often overshadows analyses of ethnic diversity within the sexual-minority
population. Culture, class, and ethnicity powerfully shape the lived experiences of sexual minorities,
influencing the manner in which they perceive and name same-sex desires; the meanings they craft
of these desires; the opportunities, costs, and contexts of sexual behavior; and their very notion of
an individual sexual self (Aranda et al., 2015; Consolacion et al., 2004; Jamil et al., 2009; Nazario,
2003; Parks et al., 2004; Rosario, Schrimshaw, & Hunter, 2004). One telling example of the failure of
conventional concepts of sexual orientation to represent the experiences of ethnic minorities comes
from a study analyzing patterns of nonresponse across multiple waves of administration of the
California Health Interview Survey (Jans et al., 2015). Different ethnic groups were differentially
likely to skip the question about sexual orientation, and rates of nonresponse varied as a function of
whether individuals completed the interview in their native language. Such data provide a potent
reminder of the experiences that are literally missing from mainstream psychological discourses
about sexual orientation. Thus, an additional reason to set aside immutability arguments for sexualminority rights is that these arguments sometimes obscure intersections between sexual identity and
the dimensions of race, culture, ethnicity, religion, and social class, which give rise to unique and
varied forms of sexual-minority experience.
What Is Wrong With Being a Sexual Minority?
A final and fatal weakness of immutability arguments for the rights of sexual minorities is
that these arguments boil down to large-scale apologies or excuses for same-sex sexuality (Boucai,
2012; Schmeiser, 2009). In essence, they concede the point that same-sex sexuality is fundamentally
inferior to heterosexuality and simply counter that sexual minorities cannot be punished for being
born with their “condition” (Sullivan, 1995, p. 170). Indeed, research findings on genetic
contributions to sexual orientation necessarily raise the specter of eugenics: Might gene therapy one
day be used to “correct” sexual orientation, or might parents selectively terminate pregnancies on
the basis of the child’s sexual orientation (Greenberg & Bailey, 2001; Sedgwick, 1990; Smith, 2014)?
Regardless of whether such future scenarios are plausible, they underscore the degree to which
immutability approaches to sexual-minority rights are fundamentally linked to—and hence fail to
challenge—the social reprobation directed toward the “species” (Hammack et al., 2013) of
homosexuality.
Immutability arguments also fail to challenge the longstanding anti-gay claim that society has
an abiding interest in preventing the “spread” of same-sex sexuality, especially to children. The
protection of children from same-sex sexuality has of course been a long-standing preoccupation of
many anti-gay activists, who have argued that pro-gay policies and laws—including legalized samesex marriage—might make it more likely for children to grow up perceiving same-sex sexuality as a
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legitimate life choice (Bork, 2004; Bryant, 1979). As reviewed by Rosky (2013b), the classic response
by LGBT advocates has been that pro-gay legislation cannot possibly foster the “spread” of samesex sexuality, since sexual orientation is fixed at birth and impervious to environmental influence.
This response is obviously scientifically problematic, as the foregoing scientific review demonstrates.
Yet a deeper problem is that this response passively, implicitly accepts the premise that sexual
orientation should be controlled.
This is the premise that activists should challenge, and not the likelihood of homosexual
contagion. Quite simply, there is no legal or moral basis for states to “contain” same-sex sexuality
and to actively promote and enforce heterosexuality among children and adults (see Rosky, 2013a,
2013b). Notably, some judges have already taken this position. In the California district court
decision striking down Proposition 8, Chief Judge Vaughn Walker specifically addressed the
question of whether the legalization of same-sex marriage might induce growing numbers of
California children to adopt same-sex sexuality themselves and concluded that “California has no
interest in asking gays and lesbians to change their sexual orientation or in reducing the numbers of
gays and lesbians in California” (Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 2010, p. 967). The implications of this
statement are profound, given that it starkly challenges the fundamental premise of anti-gay activism
in the United States: that there is something wrong with same-sex sexuality. The very basis of
immutability claims, as best expressed by Uganda’s President Museveni, is that homosexuals should
be punished for their sexual desires unless they can show that these desires are beyond their control.
We can turn this argument on its head—and simultaneously make immutability claims
irrelevant as preconditions for sexual-minority rights—by arguing that same-sex sexuality is nothing
to punish. If there is no reason for societies to control and contain the expression of same-sex
sexuality, then there is no reason to invoke scientific research on the nature and cause of same-sex
sexuality to justify or challenge such policies.
CONCLUSION
In the landmark 1967 case Loving v. Virginia, the state of Virginia sought to defend the
state’s law against interracial marriage on the ground that “the scientific evidence” on miscegenation
was “substantially in doubt” (p. 6). Of course, the Supreme Court rejected this argument. The Court
famously held that “[u]nder our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a person of
another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the State” (Loving v. Virginia,
1967, p. 12). But in striking down laws against interracial marriage, the Court did not suggest that the
individuals should be free to marry a person of another race because they “couldn’t help” their
attraction to other-race individuals or because they possessed an involuntary condition making it
impossible for them to fall in love with same-race individuals. Rather, it was the fundamental
freedom to marry a partner of one’s choosing that was constitutionally protected.
We hold that the same logic applies to debates over same-sex marriage and ongoing debates
about sexual-minority rights in the United States more generally. Now that the U.S. Constitution
grants every individual the unfettered liberty to choose same-sex relationships, it simply does not
matter why these choices are made and whether they were influenced by genes, hormones, society,
or chance. To suggest that the dignity of a same-sex relationship depends on precisely what caused it
is not only gratuitous but tragic. Like many other scholars across many other disciplines, we
maintain sexual-minority rights that are framed as if they depend on scientific findings of immutable
“conditions” are not worth fighting for.
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